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In order to bring the doctrine of Effects-Based Operations (EBO) into a fully 
operational capability, Effects-Based Assessment (EBA) must provide relevant insight to 
the commander and his planning staff.  Assessments of an effects-based plan and 
execution must include an assessment of the effects of a campaign on the enemy in 
addition to an assessment of the accomplishment of friendly actions taken to achieve the 
desired effects.  Determining the effects of a campaign requires an analysis of the 
dynamics of the enemy systems.  EBA must be able to recognize the states of the 
enemy’s systems as the system states change over time.  This research advances the 
application of EBA by defining anticipated states of enemy systems, developing 
indicators to determine those states, and applying progress functions to the states in order 
to quantify attainment of the commander’s objectives.  The methodology describes a 
process for assessing combat and stability operations.  The results indicate that the EBA 
methodology developed in this research works best where the systems of interest cannot 
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1 
A METHODOLOGY FOR PERFORMING EFFECTS-BASED ASSESSMENTS 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In his 2005 Phalanx article, “Re-Operationalizing Analysis for the Warfighter,” 
Air Force Chief of Staff and former Combined Forces Air Component Commander 
(CFACC) for Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, General T. 
Michael Moseley emphasizes the importance of an operations assessment capability for 
support to the CFACC:  “We need to focus on whether we are creating the effect we want  
. . . We must also ensure the understanding of the 2nd and 3rd order effects we are having 
on the battlespace and our enemies . . . ” (Moseley, 2005:8, 9).  The Chief’s statements 
embody the essence of Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and the necessity for 
commanders, strategists, planners, and assessors to gain useful knowledge of the effects 
military actions achieve during combat operations. 
As a CFACC, General Moseley saw first-hand the challenges of executing EBO 
and the necessity of a robust assessment capability.  Across the Air Force, the operational 
and analytical communities alike have developed new doctrine, technologies, and 
processes to meet these challenges and bring the EBO concept into a fully operational 
capability.  The thesis develops a new methodology for performing Effects-Based 
Assessment that incorporates the lessons learned from past assessment efforts and 
concepts from recent doctrine, technology, and analytical methods. 
Chapter 1 summarizes the definition of EBO and presents how the assessments 
team under General Moseley implemented an effects-based assessment effort in 
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Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and the challenges the assessment team encountered.  
These challenges illustrate well the problems with the current assessment methodology.  
The chapter continues with a detailed problem statement and the objectives of this thesis.  
The chapter concludes with an overview of the rest of the document. 
1.1.1 Effects-Based Operations Defined. 
Several definitions for EBO exist and many differ only in their jargon.  The 
United States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series 
Pamphlet 7 (JWFC Pam 7) offers the most comprehensive definition of EBO: 
Operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a 
holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence 
or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application 
of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims.  (JWFC 
Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:2) 
 
JWFC Pam 7 extends this definition by decomposing EBO into four major components:  
System-of-Systems Analysis, Effects-Based Planning, Effects-Based Execution, and 
Effects-Based Assessment. 
A System-of-Systems Analysis (SoSA) model provides the holistic understanding 
of the operational environment by characterizing the complex organization, relationships, 
and key characteristics of an enemy political, military, economic, social, information, and 
infrastructure (PMESII) network.  The SoSA recognizes the multifarious linkages across 
the enemy PMESII system and describes the system using network topology.  In the 
SoSA model, the key components of the system are represented by nodes, and the 
connections between the components are represented by arcs, as shown in Figure 1.1 
(JWFC Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:10). 
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Figure 1.1  System-of-Systems Model and O-E-N-A-R Chains 
Effects-Based Planning (EBP) develops the integrated application of selected 
instruments of power.  EBP considers all domestic, information, military, and economic 
(DIME) actions available to commanders in order to influence or change enemy system 
behavior or capabilities to achieve directed policy aims.  EBP begins when the planners 
clarify commanders’ policy aims and goals and translate them into objectives.  Then, 
based on the enemy SoSA model, planners determine the enemy system behaviors and 
capabilities that need to be influenced or changed.  The desired enemy behaviors and 
capabilities are described as a set of effects required to attain the objectives.  Essentially, 
an effect is a change in the state of an enemy system.  Planners look to change the state of 
the enemy system by changing the state of enough system nodes.  Planners target the 
system nodes with a set of DIME actions to produce the desired effects (i.e., desired 
change in system behavior).  Then planners couple available resources to the actions 
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resources forms O-E-N-A-R chains.  These O-E-N-A-R chains are the basis of Effects-
Based Courses of Action (COAs) available to commanders.  In addition to the desired 
effects, planners also consider the secondary and unintended effects that may result from 
changes in the state of other enemy system nodes.  Planners can then change the COA to 
accommodate these indirect effects (JWFC Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:10-12). 
Effects-Based Execution (EBE) implements the actions set forth in EBP.  The 
subordinate military commanders and units execute the military actions from the EBP, 
which are translated as tasks via orders from the higher commanders.  Other supporting 
agencies and departments are tasked via the interagency process to perform tasks that 
accomplish the diplomatic, infrastructure, and economic actions of DIME (JWFC 
Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:16). 
Effects-Based Assessment (EBA) aims to identify progress towards the 
attainment of commander’s objectives as the campaign and EBE progresses.  EBA forms 
the basis and justification for changes in the plan and future execution.  EBA tracks both 
the accomplishment of the COA actions and the effects of those actions on the enemy.  In 
this manner, EBA assesses the overall campaign helping to identify trends affecting 
future operations.  EBA assesses the overall campaign and compares the current 
battlespace picture with the desired battlespace conditions at a given point in time.  When 
a delta exists between the current picture and desired conditions, further analysis is 
necessary to reveal the cause.  If the execution has followed the plan, then changes to the 
plan maybe required.  Conversely, if the execution has not followed the plan, then further 
analysis must reveal the cause, and the commander may redirect resources to remedy the 
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situation.  The results of EBA then feedback into EBP (JWFC Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:16-
17). 
To implement the whole of EBO, the process must include a SoSA model, EBP, 
EBE, and EBA.  The bulk of the EBO tools and literature created thus far contribute most 
to the SoSA and EBP efforts.  However, EBA methodologies remain mostly doctrinal.  
While doctrinal definitions provide a framework for conceptualizing EBA, they offer 
little in the way of operational implementation with regard to actually assessing the 
actions and effects in EBO. 
1.1.2 Effects-Based Assessment in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. 
  The most recent large-scale air campaign assessment effort occurred in 2003 
during the first days of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).  In OIF, planners 
attempted to implement EBA into the operational assessment process, however, the 
current EBA construct was not conducive to the rapid pace, short duration, highly 
dynamic nature of OIF (Allen, 2005:v). 
At the height of air operations, the Operational Assessment (OA) team, who was 
responsible for conducting EBA, consisted of 17 members.  Their mission was to track 
the progress of the CFACC’s ten Operational Objectives broken into over 200 Tactical 
Tasks with nearly 300 Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Success Indicators (SIs).  
MOEs measured the progress of the tactical tasks assigned to the flying units; though 
called MOEs, the metrics actually tracked coalition actions and not effects.  SIs measured 
progress towards operational objectives and provided broad qualitative guidance for 
operational assessment.  The SIs were independent of the MOEs and provided evidence 
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of effects of coalition actions on the enemy.  The OAT tracked the MOEs and SIs daily, 
updating the metrics iteratively as necessary.  Figure 1.2 depicts the basic strategy-to- 
task hierarchy used for the Joint Air Operations Plan of OIF (Thoele, DiSebastain, and 
Garcia, 2004; Allen, 2005:19). 
 
Figure 1.2  Strategy-to-Task Hierarchy used in OIF (Thoele, DiSebastian, and Garcia, 2004) 
This process, however, failed to answer the questions of the CFACC and did not 
successfully guide and steer the air strategy (Thoele, 2004a; Allen, 2005:22).  In his 2005 
School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) thesis, Major Neil Allen pinpoints 
the reasons for the shortcomings in the OA team process:  “In a short, fast-paced war like 
OIF . . . the EBA construct is difficult if not impossible to achieve given the doctrine, 
organizational structure, and technology within the CAOC” (Allen, 2005:3). 
The organization problems that hampered the EBA efforts, as Allen describes them, are 
stove-piped, hierarchical structures and insufficient manning levels inside the CAOC, 
along with conflicting interests and prioritizations outside the CAOC.  Allen also points 
out that the EBA doctrine was lacking, insufficient, or not conducive in guiding and 





















short of explaining how to do it.  Without a defined EBA process to guide them, OA team 
assessors were poorly equipped to accomplish EBA during OIF (Allen, 2005:24, 38, 41). 
Therein lies the biggest problem facing the analytical community with regards to 
EBA:  no proven assessment methodology exists that provides insight to the commander 
and helps guide the air strategy.  Valid complaints of the current EBA methodology 
include that it is too complex, too time consuming, and too dependent on intangible 
assessment inputs to adapt to a war like OIF.  In order to guide the commander’s strategy, 
assessments need to be timely, accurate, and actionable.  Any new EBA constructs must 
be operationally useful and efficient in a war as fast, short, and dynamic as OIF.  Put 
another way, an EBA construct must be useful to the CFACC, and the benefits gained 
from accomplishing EBA remain greater than or equal to the overall expenditure of 
effort, resources, or human life.  The challenge then is to formulate an EBA construct that 
is timely, accurate, actionable, efficient, simple, quantifiable, adaptable, and most 
importantly, provides relevant insight to the CFACC and military planners (Allen, 
2005:9, 75-78). 
1.2 Problem Statement 
To provide relevant insight to the CFACC and Strategy Division in a Combined 
Air Operations Center (CAOC) environment, the assessment of an EBO plan and 
execution must include an assessment of the effects of the air campaign on the enemy in 
addition to an assessment of the accomplishment of friendly actions taken to achieve the 
desired effects.  Determining the effects of the air campaign requires an analysis of the 
dynamics of the enemy systems.  EBA must be able to recognize the state of the enemy 
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systems as the system states change over time.  This thesis advances the application of 
EBA by defining anticipated states of enemy systems, developing indicators to determine 
the state of enemy systems, and applying progress functions to the anticipated and desired 
states of the enemy systems in order to describe progress of the campaign towards 
attainment of the commander’s objectives. 
1.3 Research Objective 
The objective of this thesis is to establish a an EBA construct that supports the 
EBO process by providing timely, actionable information to the CFACC and CAOC 
staff.  The construct will be flexible to changes in the operational environment, complex 
enough to provide accurate information, simple enough to be performed on existing 
CAOC tools, and efficient in the use of CAOC resources.  In addition, this thesis defines 
the necessary phases of an EBA process and the methods to be applied, setting the stage 
for future research into more robust stochastic methods and the development of future 
tools. 
1.4 Research Scope 
This thesis focuses on the assessment of an air campaign at the operational level 
of warfare.  The methodology is described from the viewpoint of an OA team within a 
CAOC.  This methodology assesses three elements of EBO:  the accomplishment of 
CFACC actions, the achievement of CFACC desired effects, and the progress towards the 
attainment of CFACC operational objectives.  The methodology implicitly considers the 
constraints of time and personnel on an OA team, and therefore is designed to be applied 
to one or two high-priority commander objectives.  The methodology explicitly describes 
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a process for assessing combat operations, though the methodology is intended to be 
general enough to enable its application to stability operations as well. 
1.5 Assumptions 
The methodology developed in this thesis makes the following key assumptions 
about pre-conflict analysis of the enemy and data availability during conflict: 
 A SoSA model exists for the enemy in some form, and this model is used by 
the planners to develop the courses of action examined in EBP.  Though SoSA 
models are discussed in Chapter 2, this thesis does not include development of 
a SoSA in the methodology. 
 All data necessary to perform the assessments described in this methodology 
are available to the assessors.  Many of the problems described by Allen and 
Thoele et al deal specifically with data collection, compilation, and 
dissemination within the CAOC.  This thesis views these issues as 
organizational constraints, which require procedural solutions, and are 
therefore outside of the scope of this thesis.  For further analysis and research 
on procedural solutions to data availability for CAOC operations, see Allen 
(2005) and Air Combat Command (2004). 
Other assumptions made in this thesis will be described in the appropriate position within 
the methodology. 
1.6 Overview and Format 
This thesis is divided into five chapters:  Chapter 1, Introduction; Chapter 2, 
Literature Review; Chapter 3, Methodology; Chapter 4, Results and Analysis; and 
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Chapter 5, Discussion.  Chapter 2 presents an overview of EBO and discusses in detail a 
formal definition of effects, including different types and levels of effects as they apply to 
warfare.  Chapter 2 also presents some historical examples of the application of EBA and 
then reviews relevant methods from the fields of medicine, risk analysis, quality control, 
and decision theory. 
Chapter 3 describes the mathematical construct of EBA and presents a seven 
phase methodology for performing EBA.  Chapter 4 applies the EBA methodology to two 
examples.  The first example is a combat operations scenario example based on conflicts 
the United States Air Force has been involved in over the last two decades.  The second 
example is a stability operations scenario based on the operations involved in nation 
building such as with those associated with OIF.  Chapter 5 then discusses the limitations 
and contributions of the methodology, as well as areas for future research. 
11 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 reviews existing research and publications relevant to the analysis 
methods described in the methodology of Chapter 3.  Chapter 2 first looks at the 
definition and components of Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and a formal definition of 
effects.  Next, the chapter investigates the major components of EBO, namely 
Operational Net Assessment (which is the formal Joint process that performs System-of-
Systems Analysis), Effects-Based Planning (EBP), Effects-Based Execution (EBE), and 
Effects-Based Assessments (EBA).  Then Chapter 2 reviews the contributions of 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the most recent large-scale assessments effort of an air 
campaign.  Chapter 2 next discusses a new model for EBA based on the Jones Criteria for 
diagnosing rheumatic fever.  The Jones Criteria model leads to a discussion of measures, 
indicators, and criteria for good indicators of system capability and behavior.  Next, 
Chapter 2 presents tools for the development and use of indicators that includes cause-
and-effect diagrams (fishbone charts), operational experience, and Powell’s 40-70 
principle for decision making with incomplete information.  The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the contributions of risk analysis and decision theory, and the subtle 
differences between value functions and the progress functions introduced in Chapter 3. 
2.2 EBO Defined 
Several definitions for EBO exist.  Virtually every document written on EBO 
contains a definition with a flavor unique to the publication, however, each definition of 
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EBO contains the same general concepts.  This thesis draws primarily from the United 
States Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7; 
Mann, Endersby, and Searle; and Smith to describe EBO and its components.  This thesis 
begins with the definition of EBO prescribed by the United States Joint Forces Warfare 
Center Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7:  
Operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a 
holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence 
or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application 
of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims.  (JWFC 
Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:2) 
 
This thesis considers the operational environment to be a composite of all elements, 
conditions, and influences that affect the employment of resources and capabilities that 
bear on the decisions of the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC).  In 
addition, the operational environment is comprised of political, military, economic, 
social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) systems.  Analysis of these systems and 
their interrelationships provides the “holistic understanding” mentioned in the definition 
(JWFC Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:2). 
A system is defined as a functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related 
group of elements that interact together as a whole (JWFC Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:2).  
This thesis will refer to enemy systems that will change behavior or capabilities.  When 
the systems being described belong to the United States or coalition allies, they will be 
denoted as friendly systems. 
Instruments of power can include diplomatic, informational, military, economic 
(DIME), and other means available to national leaders to influence the operational 
environment.  This thesis is concerned only with instruments within the primary control 
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of the CFACC, that is military and informational means.  Likewise, directed policy aims 
refer to the objectives of the CFACC and the Combined Forces Commander (CFC) that 
comprise the desired operational end state relevant to the operation at hand (JWFC 
Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:3).   
In summary, for the purpose of this thesis, EBO is the set of operations planned, 
executed, assessed, and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational 
environment in order to influence or change enemy system behavior or capabilities using 
the integrated application of selected instruments of power (military and informational) to 
achieve CFACC and CFC objectives. 
2.3 Effects 
The above definition of EBO speaks of influencing or changing enemy systems.  
These changes to enemy systems embody the essence of effects.  Mann et al describe an 
effect as the “full range of outcomes, events, or consequences that result from a specific 
action” (Mann, Endersby, and Searle, 2002:31).  Similarly, JWFC Pamphlet 7 describes 
an effect as “the physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from a military 
and nonmilitary action or set of actions” (JWFC Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:2).  The key 
elements of an effect for this thesis are as follows: 
1. A system of interest exists in an initial state. 
2. The system transitions to a different state as a result of an action.  (To be 
clear, in this thesis, “do nothing” can be an action.) 
3. The resulting change in the state of the system is the effect. 
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2.3.1 First, Second, and Third Order Effects. 
Effects can be broken down into direct and indirect effects.  Direct effects are 
immediate and easily recognizable.  Indirect effects are often the cumulative result of 
many direct effects.  First-order effects are direct effects, which result immediately from 
an action.  In the case of kinetic operations, results of the action are directly attributable 
to military attack on a target (Mann, Endersby, and Searle, 2002:31-32). 
Second and third-order effects are indirect effects.  These effects result from one 
or two intermediate effects or mechanisms, thereby producing a final outcome.  A 
second-order effect has one intermediate effect, the first-order effect; while a third-order 
effect has two intermediate effects, the first and second-order effects.  Second and third-
order effects tend to be delayed and are typically more difficult to recognize than direct 
effects (Mann, Endersby, and Searle, 2002:32-33). 
2.3.2 Cumulative and Cascading Effects. 
Cumulative effects result from the aggregate of many direct or indirect effects.  
Cumulative effects generally occur at the operational and strategic levels of warfare, 
although they may occur at the tactical level.  Cumulative effects can be considered the 
“roll-up” of multiple first, second, and third-order effects.  Cascading effects occur when 
indirect effects flow from higher levels to lower levels of employment (Mann, Endersby, 
and Searle, 2002:34).  Cascading effects can be considered the distribution of second and 
third-order effects created by a direct or first-order effect on an a large highly connected 
system. 
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2.3.3 Collateral Effects. 
An effect is the resulting state of a system due to an action.  Depending on the 
nature of the system state and whether the system is enemy or friendly, the effect can be 
positive or negative.  Collateral effects are defined as any outcome (or resulting state of a 
system) other than what was intended, whether positive or negative.  In EBO, collateral 
effects should be a major, deliberate consideration in planning, executing, and assessing 
military actions (Mann, Endersby, and Searle, 2002:35-36). 
2.3.4 Types of Effects on a System. 
The nature of the system and the action applied to the system will dictate the 
resulting state of the system.  How the system is changed by the action can be described 
by four different types of effects on a system:  physical effects, functional effects, 
systemic effects, and psychological effects. 
Physical effects are direct, first-order effects.  Their primary purpose is to 
“damage, disrupt, or neutralize a target or group of targets through the application of 
military force” (Mann, Endersby, and Searle, 2002:37).  Physical effects result in a 
physical alteration of the system.  Functional Effects are direct or indirect effects of 
actions on the ability of a target or system to function properly and perform its mission.  
Systemic effects are effects that are aimed at disrupting the operation of a specific system 
or set of systems.  Psychological effects are the results of actions that influence emotions, 
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of individuals, groups, 
organizations, and foreign governments (Mann, Endersby, and Searle, 2002:37-38). 
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2.3.5 Effects at Different Levels of Warfare. 
Changes in a system behavior or capability can occur at any of the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels of warfare.  Both the nature of the system and the action 
applied to it can determine the level of the effect.  Strategic effects contribute to affecting 
an enemy’s overall political, military, and economic capacities as well as its 
psychological stability.  Strategic actions are activities associated with the campaign 
effort as a whole.  Operational level actions are activities that affect an entire theater of 
operations.  The focus of operational actions is on the war-making potential of the enemy 
within the theater of operations.  Tactical effects are the result of an action or actions at 
the individual unit level.  Tactical effects generally occur on a localized basis and are 
immediate and short in duration (Mann, Endersby, and Searle, 2002:40-41).   
The focus of this thesis is determining the impact of military operations at the 
operational level.  Generally speaking, operational effects can be direct effects and 
indirect effects of tactical effects.  Operational effects can also result from cumulative 
effects from tactical actions and other operational effects as well as cascading effects 
from strategic actions. 
2.3.6 Precisely Defining Effects. 
Gallagher et al describe the necessity of precisely defined effects for the proper 
execution of EBO.  Gallagher et al state that analysts must be able to identify elemental 
effects that lend themselves to analytical modeling and analysis in order for analytical 
methods to be applied to EBO.  Furthermore, a bottom-up approach for EBO planning 
and assessment requires careful definition of these elemental effects such that they 
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achieve exhaustive coverage, mutual exclusivity, and independence from the means of 
achievement of the effects (Gallagher, True, and Whiteman, 2004:9).  
A problem, however, is that the current EBO taxonomy focuses on a set of verbs to 
describe effects (a consequence of a particular action).  Few of the proposed EBO verb 
sets provide detailed definitions.  In fact, most effects implied by the verb sets (terms) are 
less than precise, are not mutually exclusive, and often imply kinetic means to achieve 
the effect.  That is, the use of these terms to describe effects lacks the rigor and precision 
required for mathematical analysis (Gallagher, True, and Whiteman, 2004:9).  Therefore, 
Gallagher et al state that effects should not be defined in terms of verbs, but rather should 
be defined as an impact on a single functional capability or behavior with four 
specifications (Gallagher, True, and Whiteman, 2004:9): 
• Range ( a capability-range is the affected area, such as target, city, region or state, 
whereas behavior-range is the affected individual, group or nation); 
• Extent (specifies the resulting level of capability or behavior whether it is 
decreased, maintained or increased); 
• Start time; 
• End time. 
This thesis uses the specifications for precisely defining effects outlined by 
Gallagher et al as the initial step in a comprehensive EBA methodology.  Chapter 3 
describes how well-defined desired effects are used to direct the EBA process.  With 
regards to the analytical requirements of the effects definition (exhaustive coverage, 
mutually exclusivity, and independence from the means of achievement), this thesis 
discusses neither the need for the effects to be independent from the means of 
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achievement nor the need for mutual exclusivity.  While exhaustive coverage directly 
supports the EBA method through the assessment of the higher objectives, independence 
from the means of achievement primarily supports the planning process to determine 
actions.  Likewise, mutually exclusivity of effects is an invalid assumption when effects 
are viewed through the interconnected system-of-systems model.  Achieving one effect 
may aid or deter the achievement of other effects, and therefore effects are not mutually 
exclusive. 
Desired effects may be defined in terms of two different sets of consequences:  
those to be achieved and those to be avoided (Gallagher, True, and Whiteman, 2004:15).  
JWFC Pamphlet 7 states that a “specified effect describes desired or undesired conditions 
. . . that results form a set of actions (JWFC Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:12).”  Therefore, 
planners must consider both types of effects and the systems they involve when 
decomposing the commander’s objectives into a set of effects.  This thesis considers the 
contributions of undesired and collateral effects in the overall assessment methodology. 
2.4 Components of EBO 
 An EBO methodology is a means for planning, executing, and assessing 
operations designed to attain the effects required to achieve desired national security 
outcomes (Mann, Endersby, and Searle, 2002:46).  An EBO methodology relies heavily 
on a comprehensive system-of-systems understanding of the operational environment.  
Therefore, the EBO process begins with a complete system-of-systems understanding of 
the enemy and proceeds with three highly interdependent and overlapping major 
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components:  effects-based planning, effects-based execution, and effects-based 
assessment (JWFC Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:8-9). 
2.4.1 Operational Net Assessment and System-of-Systems Analysis. 
Virtually no part of a target system or its infrastructure is isolated, therefore it is 
important to develop a better understanding of inherent relationships of effects to 
incorporate understanding into planning, execution, and assessment of EBO (Mann, 
Endersby, and Searle, 2002:34, 39).  In order to build a holistic knowledge base of the 
operational environment, EBO begins with a System-of–Systems Analysis (SoSA) of the 
enemy PMESII systems.  Operational Net Assessment (ONA) is the organizational 
process that performs the SoSA and develops the SoSA model (JWFC Doctrine Pam 7, 
2004:9).   
United States Joint Forces Command defines ONA as “the integration of people, 
processes, and tools that use multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to 
enhance command decision-making.”  The aim of ONA is to produce a coherent, relevant 
and shared knowledge environment for planners and decision makers.  In doing so, ONA 
uses link analysis, network analysis and structured augmentation to assess an adversary’s 
PMESII systems, thus producing a SoSA model.  The SoSA model reveals critical nodes 
and vulnerabilities that may be used in EBO.  In order to create the SoSA model, ONA 
integrates military, national agencies, coalition governments, nongovernmental 
organizations and other partners who have information to contribute.  ONA is a 
continuous and dynamic process that operates through peacetime and conflict.  ONA 
enables commanders to avoid conflict by engaging opponents in influence and deter 
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methods; likewise, ONA offers defeat mechanisms to accomplish commanders’ 
objectives during times of conflict.  In this manner, ONA provides the first crucial piece 
of EBO, the SoSA model of enemy systems (USJFCOM, 2006). 
A SoSA model provides a framework for understanding the battlespace by 
characterizing the complex organization, relationships, and key characteristics of an 
enemy PMESII network.  SoSA recognizes the linkages across the various areas of an 
enemy system and describes the connections and key components of the entire system.  A 
SoSA model decomposes the system of interest into a network of nodes and links (Figure 
2.1).  A node can be a person, place, or any physical thing that is a fundamental 
component of the system.  Links represent the behavioral, physical, or functional 
relationship between the nodes.  These links, are the basis for the causal linkages, which 
describe why planners think the proposed actions will achieve the desired effects.  A 
SoSA model increases the understanding of how actions taken against one element of the 
system can affect the entire system as well as other elements of the system.  (JWFC 
Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:10; Mann, Endersby, and Searle, 2002:49) 
 
Figure 2.1  System of Systems Model of a PMESII System 
PMESII System 
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2.4.2 Example SoSA Models. 
Building SoSA models brings additional analytical challenges to the operational 
implementation of EBO.  Several  authors have offered techniques and tools to facilitate 
the building of a SoSA model.  This thesis examines briefly two SoSA methods for 
building models, one by Lee and Kupersmith and the other by Goodwinan and Lee.  Lee 
and Kupersmith describe a hierarchical structure for a SoSA model based on their 
Objectives to Metrics Methodology (OMM);  Goodwin and Lee describe a more robust 
version of a SoSA model, the Net-Centric Effects-Based Operations Model (NEMO), 
which is based on existing engineering models of infrastructure networks.  Together these 
methods represent the broad spectrum of complexity of SoSA models, with OMM being 
a simpler form of a SoSA model and NEMO being a more complex form.  In this thesis 
models that represent a system on the basis of topology alone are considered to be 
simple; models that require engineering-level detail to represent the system are 
considered to be complex. 
Lee and Kupersmith base their SoSA frameworks on two broad conditions under 
which desired effects can be achieved:  1) the enemy “can’t” achieve their own desired 
objectives; 2) the enemy “won’t” perform activities in support of their objectives.  
“Can’t” speaks to the enemy’s capability.  “Won’t” speaks to the enemy’s will.  These 
conditions are a crucial part of the Objectives to Metrics Methodology (OMM).  OMM is 
a five step process designed to link a desired effect to a measurable set of metrics (Lee 
and Kupersmith, 2002:4-5). 
In OMM, planners first identify the objective based on the Commander’s Intent 
Statement for a given operation, which is generally used to describe the end-state of an 
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operation.  Second, planners define the effect using doctrinal definitions, because these 
definitions provide a formal common frame of reference.  Third, planners frame the 
effect in quantifiable terms that help determine if the effects are being accomplished or 
not.  To do this, the intent of an effect is reformed into a question to facilitate the 
establishment of metrics against an objective.  For example, for the objective Air 
Superiority, the desired effect is freedom of movement in area of interest.  The question 
then would be phrased as “Can BLUE conduct air ops without interference from RED?”  
Fourth, planners assign target sets to the effect, decomposing each of the can’t and won’t 
ideas into details from which vulnerabilities and interactions can be identified and 
prioritized for attack.  It is here that Lee and Kupersmith utilize their framework structure 
of a SoSA model (Lee and Kupersmith, 2002:4-8). 
 The Lee and Kupersmith model (Figure 2.2) consists of elements comprising each 
effect.  This structure helps to visualize the interrelationships of the various factors that 
contribute to an effect while simultaneously accounting for key factors.  In addition, the 
model helps the planner determine potential vulnerabilities for attaining a desired effect 
with acceptable consumption of resources.  This model looks at effects from both the 
can’t and won’t conditions to gain insight into key linkages between the sides of the 
framework.  It is important that the resulting tree structure be sufficiently detailed to 
define targets and actions (kinetic or non-kinetic) associated with neutralizing them (Lee 
and Kupersmith, 2002:10). 
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Figure 2.2  Enemy Systems Framework (Lee and Kupersmith, 2002:10) 
The fifth and final step of OMM is to establish metrics to measure achievement of 
the effect.  The metrics should be considered synergistically in order to measure progress 
in achieving an effect (Lee and Kupersmith, 2002:8).  This thesis views the culmination 
of effects to be a non-linear function, and agrees with Lee and Kupersmith that the effects 
should be viewed synergistically. 
Goodwin and Lee describe an automated approach for performing SoSA that 
leverages existing, commercially available software models—the Net-Centric Effects-
Based Operations Model (NEMO).  NEMO provides analysts with the means for defining 
relationships between multiple infrastructure networks within a single user interface.  
NEMO has the capability to model interactions across electrical power, water, gas, and 
road networks using “on/off interaction behavior” between the components of the 



















































effects-based planning and analysis for operations against an opponent’s physical 
infrastructure network (Goodwin and Lee, 2005:4-5, 13, 15). 
NEMO enables planners to consider a target as a component of the network 
(regardless of the target type) by providing a framework to model an opponent’s PMESII 
network as well as their interdependencies.  Specifically, NEMO integrates infrastructure 
models such as lines of communication, electrical power, gas pipelines, and water 
pipelines.  NEMO can help identify nodal intersections between system layers using a 
geospatial database; intersections are where different infrastructure layers lie within a 
user-specified distance from each other.  In this way, planners can understand how a 
particular element of one network relies on the elements of one or more other networks 
thus providing a basis for analyzing cascading effects.  Understanding and quantifying 
the nature of these relationships is the key to performing effects-based analysis (Goodwin 
and Lee, 2005:5, 7-8). 
An example of NEMO use is the analyzing the effect of bringing down electrical 
power on the travel time between points A and B in Figure 2.3.  The dashed line 
represents the shortest path.  Taking the power down at point D affects the draw bridge at 
point C on the graph.  As a result, the shortest path has changed as represented by the 




Figure 2.3.  NEMO Analysis of Electrical Outage Impact on Travel Time (Goodwin and Lee, 
2005:11) 
 
One drawback of NEMO is that it uses highly detailed physical engineering models, 
which require users with a significant amount of domain experience and knowledge of 
the infrastructure being modeled.  Knowing only the general network topology of a 
network is not sufficient to support the highly detailed modeling of NEMO.  However, 
for use in EBO a SoSA model may not require engineering level detail (Goodwin and 
Lee, 2005:12).   
The search for other methods of creating SoSA models includes those methods as 
complex and detail specific as NEMO and those that are more simplified as with OMM.  
Umstead offers a literature review of operations research methods to aid the analysis and 
building of SoSA models.  These methods include Bayesian networks, influence 
diagrams and networks, social networks, game theory, complexity theory and others 





Figure 2.4.  Resulting Time Delays in New Route Due to Power Outage (Goodwin and Lee, 
2005:12) 
 
 These examples of SoSA models and analytical methods offer a wide variety of 
starting points for developing a descriptive model of the adversary and an improved 
understanding of the relationships and linkages between components of the adversary 
system (Umstead, 2005:21).  However, performing SoSA and developing a SoSA model 
is outside the scope of this thesis.  For the purposes of the assessment methodology 
presented in Chapter 3, this thesis assumes that a SoSA model exists in some form prior 
to the start of the assessment process.  In Chapter 4, the examples presented are based on 
a simpler form of the SoSA models.  This thesis views a simpler SoSA model as 
appropriate at the operational level because the simpler form of the model requires less 





2.4.3 Effects-Based Planning. 
The goal of Effects-Based Planning (EBP) is to produce an executable course of 
action (COA).  The COAs decompose into five critical components:  objectives, effects, 
nodes, actions, and resources.  The combination of the objectives, effects, nodes, actions, 
and resources forms O-E-N-A-R chains.  These O-E-N-A-R chains from the basis of the  
COAs available to commanders.  The EPB process results in a set of COAs which 
includes measures for determining success as well as the traditional task, purpose, and 
desired end state, which have been traditionally used in operational planning (JWFC 
Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:8, 10, 12). 
EBP begins when strategists and planners clarify commanders’ goals and 
objectives.  Objectives define an end state that actions are designed to achieve.  The 
objectives are the first crucial piece of the COA.  The objectives are then further defined 
by a set of conditions or desired effects that must be created to achieve each objective.  
These desired effects require foreknowledge of specific achievable conditions believed 
necessary for attaining the objectives.  For each objective in EBP, planners determine the 
set of effects that are required to attain the objective.  Here, the SoSA model helps 
determine what PMESII behaviors or capabilities (effects) are required to achieve 
objectives.  Effects are the second piece of the O-E-N-A-R chains.  (JWFC Doctrine Pam 
7, 2004:7, 10-12; Mann, Endersby, and Searle, 2002: 44) 
The third link in the O-E-N-A-R chain is a node.  Using the SoSA model, 
planners determine which nodes of the enemy system apply to the effects.  Planners also 
consider the secondary and unintended effects that may result from changes in the state of 
the nodes (JWFC Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:10-12).  When planners carefully consider the 
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desired effects that must be established to achieve objectives and the underlying causal 
linkages between nodes, they may find that potential negative collateral effects outweigh 
the positive intended effects (Mann, Endersby, and Searle, 2002:44). 
For each node, planners can apply a set of actions to achieve the desired effects.  
EBP considers all DIME actions available to commanders in order to create desired 
effects that will achieve the commanders’ objectives.  Planners aim to harmonize DIME 
actions to influence PMESII systems in order to achieve desired effects, which leads to 
attainment of operational objectives (JWFC Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:8).  Analysis of the 
causal-linkages, which describe why an action will achieve an effect, can help in 
understanding the potential contribution of a particular action towards attaining 
objectives (Mann, Endersby, and Searle, 2002:49).  Finally, planners couple the actions 
to available resources and forces (JWFC Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:10-12), thus completing 
the O-E-N-A-R chain of a COA.  This thesis does not discuss the constraint of resources.  
The assumption is that the strategists and planners have all necessary resources available 
to them in order to execute a chosen COA. 
2.4.4 Effects-Based Execution. 
Effects-Based Execution (EBE) implements the actions set forth in EBP.  The 
subordinate military commanders and units execute the actions from the EBP, which are 
translated as tasks via orders from the higher commanders.  In the case of an air 
campaign, the CFACC produces the Air Tasking Order (ATO), which orders the 
subordinate units to execute the actions.  All data necessary to assess a combat operations 
will be generated by EBE.  This data includes but is not limited to mission reports 
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(MISREPS), Battle Damage Assessments (BDA), order battle charts, message traffic, 
intelligence summaries (INTSUMs), etc.  All of these sources of data will aid the 
assessment of the execution of military and information actions and the effects those 
actions create. 
2.4.5 Effects-Based Assessment. 
Effects Based Assessment (EBA) aims to identify progress towards attainment of 
commander’s objectives as the campaign and EBE progresses.  EBA forms the basis and 
justification for changes in the plan and execution.  EBA compares the current 
battlespace picture with the desired battlespace conditions at any point in time.  When a 
delta exists between the current picture and desired conditions, further analysis reveals 
the cause.  If the execution has followed the plan, then changes to the plan maybe 
required.  Conversely, if the execution has not followed the plan, then further analysis 
must reveal the cause, and the commander may redirect resources to remedy the situation 
(JWFC Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:16-17).  Each piece of the EBA process will contribute to 
the methodology presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
Several types of assessment exist to aid EBA, including physical assessment, 
target system assessment, performance assessment, and psychological assessment.  
Physical assessment of an individual target looks at the direct, first-order effect of a 
kinetic military action.  Physical assessment is a necessary component of EBA and 
focuses on specific, enumerable critical nodes.  Physical assessment determines which 
nodes of the system are still functioning to ensure the desired effect of the system is 
achieved (Smith, 2002:358).  Physical assessments are then used to perform target system 
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assessment;  the physical assessment information is fused with functional damage to a 
target system and an evaluation is made of the overall impact on the system’s capabilities 
(Mann, Endersby, and Searle, 2002:38). 
Performance assessment involves monitoring the physical performance of a 
system over time and comparing the baseline performance to the performance post-
action.  Performance assessment is largely quantifiable.  System performance metrics 
look at the culmination of indirect physical effects planners hoped would grow from 
destruction of the key nodes in the system.  The critical element in performance 
assessment is less the collection of new data on the system than it is the availability of a 
data or knowledge base from which to calculate change (Smith, 2002:358-359, 366). 
 When dealing with large systems, the effects will cross over into the 
psychological domain, which is considered in psychological assessment.  Psychological 
assessment operates on two levels:  physical indicators (point indicators) and indirect 
psychological effects determined by intuition and mental models of decision makers and 
subject-matter experts.  Psychological effects are extremely difficult to measure 
accurately, although performance assessment can be used to assess behavioral changes, 
which could indicate psychological effects (Smith, 2002:367, 370-372; Mann, Endersby, 
and Searle, 2002:39). 
The EBA methodology of Chapter 3 does not specifically dictate a process for 
performing the above listed assessments, however these assessments are very important 
to the completion of the methodology.  To perform EBA, each of these assessments plays 
a vital role in determining the status of the enemy systems under consideration in EBO.  
The methodology presented in this thesis views the actual assessment of the enemy 
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systems as a function of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division 
within the CAOC.  The methodology then uses these assessments as data to perform an 
overall effects assessment.   
2.5 EBA in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
The assessment methodology used during the air war of OPERATION IRAQI 
FREEDOM (OIF) is the most recent example of a large-scale assessment of an air 
campaign at the operational level.  The methodology used in OIF offers a starting point 
for developing future methods such as the one in this thesis.  The methodology used in 
OIF implemented many but not all of the items listed previously in this chapter.  The 
Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP) was based on a Strategy-to-Task hierarchy developed 
by the strategic planners with input from assessors.  The Strategy-to-Task hierarchy 
consisted of Operational Objectives, Tactical Objectives, Tactical Tasks, Success 
Indicators (SI), Focus of Effort, Desired Effects, and MOEs (Figure 2.5).  The JAOP 
contained ten Operational Objectives that were decomposed into 200+ Tactical Tasks. 
The assessors planned to assess the entire JAOP on a daily basis.  To handle the 
workload associated with assessing a campaign of that magnitude, the assessors assigned 
Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPR) and Subject Matter Experts (SME) in all 
sections of the CAOC.  The OPRs and SMEs helped to develop the Tactical Tasks and 
MOEs as well as provide the data needed to assess their accomplishment.  At the task 
level, assessors defined quantitative MOEs to determine the task accomplishment and the 
achievement of first-order desired effects. 
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Figure 2.5  Example Strategy-to-Task Hierarchy used in OIF (Thoele, DiSebastian, and 
Garcia, 2004) 
At the objective level, assessors defined SIs that represented evidence of effects 
and the attainment of objectives.  The SIs were a more subjective assessment than MOEs 
and were assessed independently of the MOEs.  The assessors along with planners, 
OPRs, and SMEs developed over 300 MOEs and SIs.  The Focus of Effort and Desired 
Effects (not pictured) were planning tools used to guide the Air Tasking Order cycle and 
were not used in the assessment process (Thoele, DiSebastian, and Garcia, 2004). 
To assess the overall campaign, the assessors and planners applied weights to 
each level of the hierarchy.  As the OPRs provided data, the assessors calculated the 
MOE scores along with the hierarchy weights in an additive value function.  The result 
was a normalized rating between 0 and 1; 0 being the lowest rating and 1 being the 
highest.  This mathematical rating along with a subjective assessment was then translated 
into a stoplight-chart assessment for the Tactical and Operational Objectives (Figure 2.6).  





















be put aside in order to solve other CAOC issues and provide the CFACC with answers 
to other pressing questions (Thoele, DiSebastian, and Garcia, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 2.6  Example Assessment from OIF (Thoele, DiSebastian, and Garcia, 2004) 
Assessing the JAOP each day required assessors to make determinations on the 
CFACC’s top 100 prioritized Tactical Tasks.  This equated to gathering data for 150 to 
200 MOEs and SIs daily.  Even with SMEs and OPRs throughout the CAOC, and a 
robust in-house database created by the OA team specifically for their mission, the 17-
member OA team could not keep up with all of the metrics.  The number of metrics to be 
tracked was just too great for the OA team to track comprehensively on a daily basis.  
The number of metrics (approximately 150) provides this thesis with an upper bound for 
the number of metrics and indicators capable of being tracked in practice.  The 
methodology presented in Chapter 3 states the tractable number of indicators to be 
tracked is 50 to 60, based on the recommendations of Thoele et al (Thoele, DiSebastian, 
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Though called “Measures of Effectiveness,” the MOEs actually tracked coalition 
efforts and not effects.  Of the 200 tasks there were only five distinct types of tasks, each 
with a corresponding type of MOE.  Table 2.1 summarizes the tasks and MOEs used to 
assess the air campaign.  This thesis uses the MOE structure from OIF to aid actions 
assessment as a part of the overall EBA methodology.  The methodology presented in 
Chapter 3 designates measures of performance (MOP) for tracking friendly actions.  
These MOPs are based upon the format of four of the MOEs outlined in the OIF 
methodology (Thoele, DiSebastian, and Garcia, 2004). 




Percentage of the enemy 
degraded/disrupted/ 
destroyed/neutralized.  
Influence the enemy. Enemy behaves as desired. 
Locate, monitor, and track enemy units. Percentage of known enemy units 
located/monitored/tracked. 
Detect and identify specific enemy 
capabilities (GPS jamming, etc.) 
Number of occurrences of enemy 
capability detected and identified. 
Maintain 24-hour coverage/specific 
capability. 
Percentage of coverage/capability 
maintained.  
2.6 Jones Criteria as a Model for EBA 
This thesis now takes a turn towards another way of thinking about assessing 
effects, borrowing a model methodology from the field of medicine.  In 1944, Dr T. 
Duckett Jones published a set of criteria for the diagnosis of rheumatic fever (Table 2.2).  
The modified Jones Criteria form the basis for the diagnosis criteria that are still used 
today.  Rheumatic fever is known to be related to previous infection with group A β-
hemolytic streptococci, but how the disease operates in the patient, or its mechanism, is 
unknown.  No specific laboratory diagnostic test exists, and distinguishing the disease 
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from other diseases is sometimes impossible.  Therefore, the diagnosis of rheumatic fever 
must be arbitrary and empirical (Rutstein et al, 1956; Rheumatic Fever, 2005). 
Jones proposed a list of criteria divided into major and minor categories.  
Categorization of the criteria depended on their relative occurrence in rheumatic fever 
and their relative occurrence in other disease syndromes, which need to be differentiated 
from rheumatic fever.  For example, chorea is included in the major criteria, while fever, 
a symptom common to many diseases, is included in the minor criteria (Rutstein et al, 
1956). 
Table 2.2  Jones Criteria for Diagnosis of Rheumatic Fever (Rutstein et al, 1956) 
Major Criteria Minor Criteria 
  I.  Carditis   I.  Fever 
 II.  Polyarthritis  II.  Arthalgia 
III.  Chorea III.  Prolonged P-R Interval in the 
Electrocardiogram 
IV.  Subcutaneous Nodules IV.  Increased Erythrocyte Sedimentation Rate, 
Presence of C-reactive Protein or Leukocytosis 
 V.  Erythema Marginatum  V.  Evidence of Preceding Beta-hemolytic 
Streptococcal Infection 
 VI.  Previous History of Rheumatic Fever or the 
Presence of Inactive Rheumatic Heart Disease 
 
The use of the criteria dictates that “the presence of two major criteria or one 
major and two minor criteria indicates a high probability of the presence of rheumatic 
fever” (Rutstein et al, 1956).  Additionally, the criteria are not meant to substitute the 
judgment, wisdom, and experience of the physician.  The criteria are designed only to 
guide the diagnosis of the disease (Rutstein et al, 1956). 
The diagnosis of rheumatic fever presents challenges similar to EBA.  Assessors 
look to define the current state of enemy and coalition systems in order to determine 
progress towards desired effects and objectives.  Often, assessors know a cause or 
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condition related to the desired end state but have no direct indicator to determine the 
current state of a system.  Also, how a system moves from state to state is often unknown.  
Likewise, distinguishing one state from another can be difficult and even impossible, and, 
similar to diagnosing rheumatic fever, determining a state of a given system must be 
arbitrary and empirical.  Therefore, developing a set of criteria or indicators appropriately 
weighted based on the relative likelihood of occurrence of a system state may also be 
useful in performing EBA.  The methodology presented in Chapter 3 develops this idea 
further, describing means to define system states and likely indicators of those states. 
2.7 Measures and Indicators 
The key question of EBA asks “How do assessors know if the effect has been 
achieved?”  Measures and indicators are the tools used to answer this question.  In this 
thesis, measures denote the actual numerical value associated with the assessment.  This 
thesis will also refer to measures as metrics.  Indicators denote the event that is to be 
described by a measure.  For example, an indicator of an effect might be “the enemy 
daily sortie rate decreases.”  Then, the actual number or percentage decrease of sorties 
would be the measure—say “25% decrease” or “30 sorties” for example.  Two typical 
measures in EBO and assessment literature are Measures of Performance and Measures 
of Effectiveness.  Timmerman adds to these a Measure of Interaction, discussed in 
Section 2.72.. 
2.7.1 Measures of Performance and Effectiveness. 
Two types of measures are used in practice to aid EBA—Measures of 
Performance (MOPs) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs).  MOPs exist to track task 
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accomplishment.  MOPs serve as a metric for the level of completion of the planned 
actions.  MOEs exist to track the effects of actions taken on the enemy.  MOEs measure 
changes in the PMESII system, or SoSA model.  MOEs focus on effects achievement.  
MOEs are also key measures of progress towards the change in system behavior.  
Combined together, MOPs and MOEs provide an assessment of current operations 
performance and help to identify trends affecting future operations (JWFC Doctrine Pam 
7, 2004:12, 17).  This thesis will discuss methods of using and combining MOPs and 
MOEs in order to perform campaign assessment. 
2.7.2 Timmerman’s Three Measures. 
Timmerman defines three types of measures using Col John Boyd’s Observer, 
Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop model.  Timmerman’s EBA process views combat 
operations as two interlocking OODA loops—one for BLUE forces and one for RED 
forces (Figure 2.7).  Timmerman’s measures for EBA follow directly from this model.  
The first of Timmerman’s measures is the Measure of Effort.  This corresponds to the 
MOP defined earlier.  As Timmerman puts it, “the [C]FACC has to know the present 
capabilities of his forces and the actions they are currently carrying out.”  The second of 
Timmerman’s measures is the Measure of Interaction (MOI).  An MOI is the measure of 
“the immediate results of [coalition] actions and their interaction with enemy efforts and 
the environment.”  Timmerman’s third measure is identical to the MOE previously 
defined.  An MOE, according to Timmerman, measures the “emerging consequences of 
those results on the enemy’s capabilities and decisions” (Timmerman, 2003:32-34).    
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The addition of MOIs does not significantly change the methodology of this 
thesis.  The methodology presented in Chapter 3 is indicator based.  Since measures of all 
types refer to the quantitative portions of the indicators used in this thesis, MOEs, MOPs, 
and MOIs will all be used, though not explicitly by name.  MOPs, however, are used by 
name when tracking the progress of friendly actions taken by the coalition forces. 
 
Figure 2.7  Interacting OODA Loops (Timmerman, 2003:33) 
Timmerman’s description of assessing stability operations differs slightly from 
his description of assessing combat operations.  Timmerman states that operations that 
are non-combat in nature such as humanitarian and mobility missions can be viewed 
similarly to combat operations but with a single OODA loop.  The actions in stability 
operations interact only with the environment.  Therefore, Timmerman asserts, only 
Measures of Effort and Measures of Interaction matter since there is no opponent whose 
















in Chapter 4, the EBA methodology does not address the use or lack of use of any type of 
measure. 
2.7.3 Early Warning Indicators. 
Smith states that assessing effects can resemble the indications and warning 
intelligence methods developed during the Cold War to determine when the enemy is 
preparing an attack.  The methodology Smith describes serves as a  skeleton for the 
methodology presented in Chapter 3.  The methodology will flesh out this skeleton to 
develop and apply indicators of the states of enemy systems.  The Cold War methodology 
Smith describes was comprised of the following (Smith, 2002:382): 
 development of extensive list of indicators based on postulated actions the enemy 
might take; 
 indicators are made into intelligence collection priorities and regularly tracked 
and reported; 
 observable indicators are weighted for their significance and for the place they 
occupied in the sequence of preparing an attack; 
 weighted indicators are aggregated and placed into an algorithm to determine 
overall probability of attack; 
 a fundamental criterion of an indicator is that it must be in some way observable. 
2.7.4 Criteria for good indicators. 
To perform EBA, this thesis recognizes the necessity of developing good 
indicators of the effects friendly actions have on the enemy.  This section reviews the 
criteria of indicators that can serve this purpose. 
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A good indicator is one that provides insight to the state of an enemy system.  In 
order to provide insight, indicators must be both observable and relevant.  An observable 
indicator is one that can be found, fixed, and tracked by coalition ISR assets, to include 
ELINT, HUMINT, MASINT, etc.  Indicators may also be observed through open source 
means of intelligence.  Indicators provide the data for any EBA model, and as such must 
be observable to provide any input into a model.  Put simply, analysts cannot assess what 
they cannot see.  The most revealing set of metrics provides no value if no observable 
data exists to apply to the metrics.  That said, there are certain things that are not directly 
observable such as the internal workings of the enemy’s mind or the enemy’s decision 
making process.  In order to determine the state of the system, assessors must rely on the 
aspects of the emerging behavior of the enemy system (Smith, 2002:383, 386). 
To be relevant, an indicator must connote the actions taken by coalition forces and 
the effects those actions are designed to achieve.  That is, an indicator must be connected 
via a causal linkage to a coalition action and a desired effect.  In as much, an indicator 
should reflect the state of the system after the coalition action has been executed.  
Similarly, an indicator must relate somehow to the system in order to serve as evidence 
for a state change of the system.  Though coalition assets can track many potential 
indicators of the state of enemy systems, only those indicators linked to coalition action 
and the system of interest can provide insight.  Therefore, the indicator assessors seek is 
observable evidence of a behavioral change that occurs because of an executed coalition 
action (Smith, 2002:383). 
Knowing that good indicators of effects must be both observable and relevant, the 
next challenge for the assessor is to generate a set of indicators that meets these criterion.  
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Since effects represent a change in capability or behavior, the indicators assessors seek 
must reveal the nature of the system capability or behavior.  Assessors can begin by 
looking at performance measures. 
Two types of performance measures exist:  aggregate indicators and point 
indicators.  Aggregate indicators provide a measure of the overall throughput of a system.  
Point indicators provide detection and measurement of an event that differs from the 
established norm.  Both aggregate indicators and point indicators require a database on 
the system in question and continued monitoring of that system.  Assessors can use these 
measures to reveal how the system functions.  Likewise, physical and functional effects 
can indicate the success of a particular coalition action.  Physical and functional effects 
are highly quantifiable, therefore indicators relating to system capability are generally 
easier to determine (Smith, 2002:366, 369; Mann, Endersby, and Searle, 2002:37). 
 Joint Warfare Center Pamphlet 7 describes how indicators should represent 
changes in the behavioral state of a system  (JWFC Doctrine Pam 7, 2004:13). Changes 
in system behavior can indicate ongoing adaptive decision making processes of an 
adversary, which cross over into the psychological realm (Smith, 2002:370).  Mann et al 
note that psychological changes can be difficult to observe and track accurately (Mann, 
Endersby, and Searle, 2002:39).  However, performance assessment, including aggregate 
and point indicators, can be used to assess behavioral changes.  Fundamentally, 
potentially observable behavior indicators fall into two categories:  1) evidence of 
transmitting guidance for a course of action; and 2) the physical acts that the course of 
action involves.  These actions of will likely include those that the enemy wants the 
coalition to see and those which the enemy wants to conceal (Smith, 2002:370, 388, 390).   
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Indicators that relate directly to coalition actions and to planned effects are not 
always possible to observe or determine.  However, other areas exist to determine 
appropriate indicators for a given effect.  For example, any military reaction by an enemy   
will involve decisions in the political, diplomatic, and economic areas.  Similarly, moves 
in the economic, political, and diplomatic areas are likely to parallel actions in the 
military area.  If analysts look beyond the immediate set of military observables, they  
might be able to find indicators that are substantially easier to see and track (Smith, 
2002:391).  In as much, a search for evidence that an action failed to achieve an effect 
may be more productive than a search for positively reinforcing evidence (Mann, 
Endersby, and Searle, 2002:54).  Another important point is that observations need not be 
precise to be useful.  It may be sufficient to know that an activity has intensified or that 
communications between certain entities has occurred in order to determine a change in 
the system (Smith, 2002:390). 
This thesis advocates the use of indicators as a means to determine the state of the 
system of interest.  The state of the system will tell assessors how close coalition forces 
are to achieving the desired effects, and indicators will reveal to assessors the current 
state of the system.  Highlighting the most observable indicators of success/failure of an 
effect is also a basis for an ISR collection plan (Smith, 2002:397).   
2.7.5 Assessing Unexpected Enemy Reactions. 
The methodology presented in Chapter 3 leaves room to perform subjective 
assessments when the enemy reacts in a manner inconsistent with the set of predefined 
indicators for evidence of a desired effect.  Likewise, the methodology applies a progress 
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function to different states of the systems of interest.  The effect on the enemy is a 
function of the combination of states of separate systems.  The combination that occurs in 
reality may not have already been assigned a value per the progress function.  When the 
enemy reaction is unexpected or the combination of system states has not been assigned 
progress value a priori, the indicators and states witnessed by assessors needs to be 
assessed ad hoc.  Smith provides assessors with a list of relevant questions to characterize 
unexpected enemy reactions, system states, and effects.  The set of questions helps 
assessors to identify what the enemy reaction, system state, or effect is and the nature or 
extent of the reaction, state, or effect (Smith, 2002:384): 
 Is the reaction symmetric/asymmetric? 
 Does the reaction involve an escalation of force? 
 Was there no observed reaction? 
 If so, does this represent a decision not to act, a decision to postpone any reaction, 
an inability to react, or an inability for the coalition to observe/detect the reaction? 
 Which military capabilities were used? 
 What scale and geographic scope? 
 Which warfare areas? 
 Was it a lateral escalation? 
 Did the enemy attempt to exploit coalition vulnerabilities?  If so which ones? 
 Did the reaction expose enemy vulnerabilities, if so which ones? 
 How fast did the enemy react? 
 How long was the reaction sustained? 
 How long could it have been sustained? 
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 How well were the operations coordinated/synchronized? 
 What was observable and what aspects of the operation may have been unable to 
be detected? 
These questions are used to determine how the enemy perceived the military actions of 
the coalition forces and can then be used to make assessments (Smith, 2002:384). 
2.8 Cause-and-Effect Diagrams 
Developed by Dr. Kaoru Ishikawa in the field of Quality Control, cause-and-
effect diagrams are a powerful tool that illustrate the relationship between results of a 
manufacturing process (characteristics) and the possible technical causes considered  to 
exact an effect on the manufacturing process.  Cause-and-effect diagrams are drawn to 
clearly illustrate various causes affecting product quality by sorting out and relating the 
causes.  Cause-and-effect diagrams are sometimes called Ishikawa diagrams, or fishbone 
charts because of their topology (Ishikawa, 1991:229; 1989:25; Ryan, 2000:23).  
 






Analysts construct cause-and-effect diagrams by first determining the quality 
characteristic of interest (i.e. wobble during machine rotation).  This characteristic is 
something that one wants to improve and control.  Next, analysts write the main factors 
which may be causing the quality characteristic.  It is recommended to group the major 
possible causal factors of the characteristic into such items as raw materials, equipment, 
method of work, measuring method, etc.  Each individual group will form a branch of the 
diagram (Figure 2.8).  Finally, onto each of these branches, analysts write the detailed 
factors which may be the cause.  These factors are like twigs on the branch.  On each of 
the twigs, analysts write even more detailed factors making smaller twigs.  Defining and 
linking these causal factors should lead to the source of the quality characteristic 
(Ishikawa, 1989:19-20).  See Figure 2.9 for a small example. 
 
Figure 2.9  Branching of Cause-and-Effect Diagram (Ishikawa, 1989:20) 
In order for cause-and-effect diagrams to be useful, they need to illustrate the 
appropriate level of detail.  Cause-and-effect diagrams should look complicated as in 









process is too shallow or the diagram is too generalized.  Furthermore, if the cause-and-
effect diagram only lists five or six causes (even though the form is correct) then the 
diagram is probably inadequate.  This implies that a useful cause-and-effect diagram (one 
that provides insight into the process) requires at least seven to ten twigs and branches 
(Ishikawa, 1989:28-29). 
Cause-and-effect diagrams have two key advantages:  1) they can be used for any 
problem where the aim is to get results by knowing the relationships between causes and 
effects; 2) they are easily understood by anyone (Ishikawa, 1989:28-29).  This thesis 
utilizes cause-and-effect to develop a new diagram called an effects-tree diagram.  
Cause-and-effect diagrams were developed to actively seek out causes because merely 
listing causes is not really useful (Ishikawa, 1989:25; 1991:231).  The primary interest of 
this thesis is effects.  The author notes that merely listing effects is not really useful 
either.  Therefore, this thesis will use effects-tree diagrams, which are based on cause-
and-effect diagrams, as the basis for a tool that aids EBO planners and assessors to 
actively seek out effects of combat operations. 
 
Figure 2.10  Fishbone Charts (Ishikawa, 1989:28) 
(a) (b) 
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2.9 BLUE FLAG 04 
This thesis will also build upon a method for enumerating effects that was 
developed informally at a BLUE FLAG exercise in February of 2004 while the author 
served as the Deputy Chief of the Operational Assessments (OA) team, 12th Air Force.  
At the exercise, the CFACC pushed the OA team to develop indicators to measure 
progress towards the attainment of CFACC objectives.  The OA team worked with the 
Strategy Division’s planners to develop these indicators by enumerating second and 
third-order (indirect) effects until measurable indicators of enemy reactions were reached.  
This method for enumerating effects was based on single and multiple actions associated 
with key desired effects (Thoele, 2004).  In Chapter 3, this thesis takes the principles 
developed by the OA team in 2004 and combines them with principles from the cause-
and-effect diagrams to create effects-tree diagrams. 
2.10 40-70 Principle 
In his biography, My American Journey, Colin Powell describes his philosophy 
on decision making with incomplete information.  He believes that the key to making 
good decisions is to not make decisions too quickly, but to make timely decisions.  
Powell states that in to order make an informed decision, a decision maker must have at 
least 40 percent of the information.  Likewise, a decision maker should not wait until he 
has 100 percent of the information, because by then, “it is almost always too late” 
(Powell, 1995:393).  Powell surmises that a decision maker needs between 40 to 70 
percent of the information.  When he has the amount of information in that range, he can 
“go with his gut” (Powell, 1995:393).  This thesis uses the lower bound of Powell’s range 
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of required information as a thumb rule to determine the state of a system.  Phase VI of 
the EBA methodology described in Chapter 3 will require evidence for at least 40 percent 
of the indicators for a given state before assessors can reasonably conclude that a system 
is in that state. 
2.11 Assumption about Enemy Behavior 
In order to determine the capability and behavior states of the enemy, it is 
necessary to anticipate how the enemy will react to friendly actions taken against the 
enemy PMESII systems.  This is no trivial task.  As Allen points out, the enemy is 
“normally uncooperative, he will do the unexpected, the undesired, and the unplanned” 
(Allen, 2005:8-9).  Similarly, Smith states that the enemy will not respond as expected;  
therefore, the planners and assessors “must plan for an intelligent adversary who will be 
determined to defeat [commander’s] efforts by whatever means possible” (Smith, 
2002:254).  Smith considers this particular view of the enemy to be “prudent planning” 
(Smith, 200:254).  In this thesis, this view of the enemy is a fundamental assumption that 
is used to derive potential enemy behaviors resulting from friendly actions.  To be clear, 
the assumption is that the enemy will continue to fight by whatever means available to 
him.  As one avenue of war-making is blocked, the enemy will seek others, determined to 
defeat the commander’s efforts. 
2.12 Risk Assessment 
In his Risk Filtering, Ranking and Management (RFRM) methodology, Haimes  
provides tools useful to the problem of performing EBA.  RFRM is a methodology for 
identifying, prioritizing, assessing, and managing scenarios of risk to large-scale systems 
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from multiple overlapping perspectives.  In RFRM, Haimes integrates empirical and 
conceptual methods,  descriptive and normative methods, as well as quantitative and 
qualitative methods to implement a comprehensive approach to the problems of 
identifying and managing system risks (Haimes, 2004:277,279). 
Procedures for identifying risk require analysts to establish priorities among a 
large number of individual contributions to the overall system risk.  To manage the total 
risk of a system, identifying what can go wrong and the associated consequences and 
likelihoods (risk assessment) helps generate mitigation options with their trade-offs and 
impacts on future decisions.  RFRM ranks the critical elements of risk and thus 
contributes to the analysis of mitigation options, which facilitates a seemingly intractable 
decision problem by focusing on the most important contributors of risk (Haimes, 
2004:276-277). 
The eight phases of RFRM are summarized as follows (Haimes, 2004:280): 
I. Scenario Identification—An “as-planned” or “success scenario” is developed 
using Hierarchical Holographic Modeling (HMM), which is a holistic 
methodology to decompose the attributes of a system while representing the 
system through multiple perspectives and hierarchies; risk scenarios are then 
developed based on what can go wrong in the success scenario (Haimes, 
2004:89, 280).  
II. Scenario Filtering—Risk scenarios are filtered based on the responsibilities 
and interests of the relevant system user. 
III. Bicriteria Filtering and Ranking—The remaining risk scenarios are further 
filtered based on qualitative likelihoods and consequences. 
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IV. Multicriteria Evaluation—Eleven criteria are developed that relate the ability 
of the risk scenario to defeat the system. 
V. Quantitative Ranking—Additional filtering/ranking of scenarios is 
accomplished based on quantitative and qualitative matrix scales of likelihood 
and consequence. 
VI. Risk Management—Risk management options are developed to mitigate 
remaining risk scenarios including cost estimate, performance benefits, and 
risk reduction of each option. 
VII. Safeguarding Against Mission Critical Items—Analysts evaluate the 
performance of the options selected in phase VI. 
VIII. Operational Feedback—Analysts use the experience and information gained 
during implementation of mitigation measures to refine scenario filtering and 
the decision processes of earlier phases. 
This thesis draws from two general aspects of RFRM to attack the EBA problem.  First, 
as Haimes points out, the phases of RFRM “reflect a philosophical approach rather than a 
mechanical methodology” (Haimes, 2004:280).  The RFRM phases imply an iterative 
process wherein analysts move in and out of phases, repeating each as necessary to 
improve the overall process.  The EBA phases of this thesis are modeled after the RFRM 
phases to capture the same spirit of iteration.  Second, by incorporating a variety of 
approaches—empirical and conceptual,  descriptive and normative, as well as 
quantitative and qualitative—Haimes is able to capture the intent of the decision makers 
as well as provide mathematical rigor to risk assessment.  The EBA methodology 
presented in Chapter 3 aims to provide this same balance between subjective assessment 
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and objective assessment in order to provide insight to the completion of friendly actions 
and achievement of desired effects. 
The RFRM contributes a more specific characteristic to this thesis as well.  Phase 
III of RFRM combines two types of information:  likelihood of what can go wrong with a 
system, and the associated consequences.  To do this, Haimes presents an example using 
the ordinal version of the U.S. Air Force risk matrix as adapted from Military Standard 
(MIL-STD) 882, which is cited in Roland and Moriarty (Haimes, 204:282).  Haimes’ 
matrix is presented here in Figure 2.11. 
 
Figure 2.11  Example risk matrix for RFRM Phase III (Haimes, 2004:283) 
In phase III, Haimes combines the likelihoods and consequences of risk scenarios 
into a joint concept called “severity.”  To do this, Haimes divides the likelihood of risk 
source into five discrete ranges.  Similarly, Haimes divides the consequence scale into 
four or five ranges.  The scales are then placed in matrix form and the cells are assigned 
E.  Minor or no effect.
D.  Loss of some 
capability with no 
effect of mission.
C.  Loss of capability 
with some compromise 
to mission.
B.  Loss of mission.





Low Risk Moderate 
Risk
High Risk Extremely 
High Risk
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relative levels of risk severity.  The scenario categories identified in phase I are then  
distributed into cells of the matrix; those falling into the “low risk” category are filtered 
out and set aside for later consideration (Haimes, 2004:282). 
This thesis utilizes the consequence scale that Haimes presents in phase III of 
RFRM as the inspiration for an ordinal scale for the state of enemy systems.  After 
friendly actions have been taken against an enemy system, the system will transition from 
its current state to another state, and ultimately to a desired state.  The EBA methodology 
aims to track the system as it transitions from state to state using the states of the ordinal 
scale and indicators that the system is in a certain state.  The system states are then used 
to determine the progress of commanders’ objectives. 
2.13 Value Functions and Progress Functions in EBO 
As stated earlier in the chapter, previous assessment efforts have used linear 
additive value functions to determine attainment of commanders’ objectives.  This thesis 
views the use of value functions as inappropriate for the purpose of assessing attainment 
of commanders’ objectives in an EBO context, as the necessary conditions of a linear 
additive value function are not met within the interdependence of an EBO model. 
The necessary conditions of a linear additive value function include having 
attributes of an alternative that are mutually preferentially independent.  That is, all other 
attributes being equal, a level X of an attribute is always preferred to level 'X  (French, 
1986: 105-107, 120).  In EBO however, this condition is not met.  If the attributes are 
taken to be the enemy systems, and the attribute levels are taken to be the states of those 
systems, then for a given system, an arbitrary state X may not always be preferred to state 
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'X .  When other systems of a network are considered, synergies among the enemy 
systems could yield situations wherein 'X  is preferred to X when the states of other 
systems are considered.  For example, the desired end state of a conflict may include 
severing the command, control, and communications (C3) links to an enemy facility.  
However, if the lines are being exploited by coalition forces, or the enemy is expected to 
have an undesired reaction (say, fire theater ballistic missiles if communications are cut) 
then keeping the C3 intact may actually be a state of the system closer to the attainment  
of the objective than when the C3 is severed. 
Similarly, in previous assessment efforts the value function is based upon a 
hierarchical strategy-to-task structure.  In a hierarchy structure, the elements within each 
tier of the hierarchy are divided to be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.  
The elements at each level of the hierarchy must completely describe the element of the 
next higher level in the hierarchy (collectively exhaustive).  Likewise, the elements on 
the same level of the hierarchy must not overlap so as to keep from double counting the 
element’s contribution to the level above it (mutually exclusive) (Kirkwood, 1997:16-17).  
Chapter 3 will discuss in detail the implications of these two properties of hierarchies in 
an EBO model.  Essentially, a set of effects are defined to be collectively exhaustive with 
regards to the attainment of an objective.  However, since an effect may contribute to 
multiple objectives, and effects can contribute to achieving other effects, the effects are 
inherently interrelated, thus not mutually exclusive.  Violating the mutual-exclusivity 
property also makes the use of a linear additive value function inappropriate for use in an 
EBO model. 
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Instead of the linear additive value function, this thesis will introduce a progress 
function in Chapter 3 to determine attainment of objectives.  In this function, the different 
states of enemy systems will be considered as a vector of states.  Military planners and 
subject matter experts will use their experience and intuition to map these vectors to a 
value, which determines the progress towards objective attainment.  In this function, the 
differences between the state vectors are best expressed qualitatively rather than 
quantitatively.  The use of a progress function (rather than a value function) indicates  a 
subtle difference in the underlying purpose for using the function.  A value function 
represents the preference of a decision maker amongst a set of alternatives.  The progress 
function defined in this thesis represents the level attainment of a military objective.  
While these two functions can be expressed by the same mathematical formulations, the 
functions express different concepts.  This thesis aims to represent the state of an enemy 
network that best represents the commander’s view of objective attainment, which 
implies more than the commander’s preference amongst a set of alternatives. 
2.14 Conclusion 
Chapter 2 presented an overview of EBO that includes the definition of effect—a 
change in the state of system.  EBO has four key, interrelated components:  a System-of 
Systems Analysis (SoSA), Effects-Based Planning (EBP), Effects-Based Execution 
(EBE), and Effects-Based Assessment (EBA).  To develop a methodology to perform 
EBA, this thesis draws from previous assessment efforts such as the large-scale effort of 
OIF.  In order to improve upon past efforts, this thesis looks to medical diagnosis 
methods that use criteria or indicators to determine the state of a patient or system.  To 
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develop the methodology further, tools in the fields of quality control and risk assessment 
are used to derive system states and a set of indicators to signal the presence of those 
states.  These elements are then combined with the mathematics from decision theory to 
develop progress functions that represent the level of attainment of commanders’ 




The ultimate goal of Effects-Based Assessment (EBA) is to provide insight to the 
Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) and Combined Air Operations 
Center (CAOC) staff.  The CFACC wants to know what progress has been made towards 
his objectives and desired effects.  Similarly, the CAOC staff wants to know how the 
operational plan is doing with regards to achieving the desired effects, and just as 
important, the CAOC staff wants to know how coalition forces are doing with regards to 
executing the plan. The EBA methodology described in this chapter is designed to 
provide this insight. 
Section 3.2 describes the mathematical construct of EBA.  The progress function 
is defined including the use of effects, indicators, regions and state vectors.  Section 3.3 
describes a seven-phase methodology for implementing EBA in an operational context.  
The methodology begins with defining effects and concludes with a method to view the 
progress of coalition actions and their effects on the enemy over time. 
3.2 Mathematical Construct of EBA 
In general the EBA process aims to provide a quantitative measure of progress of 
the CFACC objectives and desired effects.  Per the Effects-Based Planning (EBP) Course 
of Action (COA) development process, the progress towards effects achievement 
determines the progress towards objective attainment.  That is, the progress of the 
objectives is a function of the progress of the effects.  Similarly, the progress of the 
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effects is a function of friendly actions and enemy reactions. The EBA methodology 
tracks friendly actions and observes the enemy reactions in order to assess the progress of 
the desired effects.  The progress of the effects is then used to generate the progress of the 
CFACC objectives. 
3.2.1 Progress of an Objective. 
For each CFACC objective, the EBP process produces a finite set of desired 
effects.  Let 1 2{ , ,..., }kk nE e e e= be the set of nk desired effects for objective k.  For each 
system q, there exists a set of states 0 1{ , ,..., },eqS s s s=  where 1,2,..., kq n= .  This 
notation assumes one system for each desired effect, but the notation could be adapted to 
accommodate vectors of multiple systems per effect. 
In general, an effect is a change in system state sΔ  where 
  for ,  w x w x qs s s s s S→Δ ≡ ∈  
where w xs s→  denotes the transition from state sw to state sx.  In order to achieve desired 
effect ke E∈  , system q must transition from the initial state s
0 to the desired state se,  
denoted as 
0 e
q q q qe s s s→≡ Δ =  
That is, the desired effect on system q is the change from the initial state 0qs  to the desired 
state eqs .  Achievement of these effects will be used to determine the progress towards the 
attainment of objective k. 
This thesis defines progress as the level of attainment of an objective, represented 
by a value [0,1]p∈ , where  0 denotes no attainment and 1 denotes complete attainment.  
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Let kO  be the progress of objective k.  Then, kO  can be described as a function of the 
current system states: 
1 2( , ..., )kk nO f s s s=  
where f is a progress function such that : [0,1]nf → and sq is the state of system q.  
Using this function,  1 2( , ..., ) 1k
e e e
k nO f s s s= =   and  
0 0 0
1 2( , ..., ) 0kk nO f s s s= = . 
In the previous assessment efforts mentioned in Chapter 2, (reference Sections 2.5 
and 2.13), the progress of objectives was determined by an additive value function.  
Additive value functions require two fundamental assumptions to be met:  1) the 
components within each level of the hierarchy are mutually exclusive with regards to 
each other and 2) the components are collectively exhaustive with regards to the next 
level up the hierarchy.  EBO considers operational effects that are inherently dependent 
and therefore not mutually exclusive.  Achievement of one effect may contribute to or 
impede the achievement of other effects.  Therefore, the first assumption is usually not 
met and the use of an additive value function is generally inappropriate.  However, in 
EBO the effects are taken to be collectively exhaustive within a given objective.  In the 
sense of the progress function, collectively exhaustive means that the set of effects 
provides the complete set of arguments for the progress function. 
The vector  1 2( , ,..., ) kk
nm m m
k ns s s= ∈s is called the state vector of objective k, 
where  mqs  represents the current state of system q, and {0,1,..., }.m e∈  Each state vector 
ks  represents a different point on the nk-dimensional hypercube, which represents the 
progress towards attainment of objective k.  For the system of interest n[q], as the state s 
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of n[q] changes, the element mqs changes and ks moves from point to point on the 
hypercube progressing towards the attainment of objective k. 
Consider the case where 2kn = and each system has five states.  All systems 
begin in state 0 (Figure 3.1a).  After coalition actions have been taken, the objective 
moves to point (2,2) (Figure 3.1b).  Put another way, the system of interest in the first 
effect [ ]1n , which corresponds to the first element of the vector, transitions to state 2.  
Likewise, the system of interest in the second effect [ ]2n , which corresponds to the 
second element of the vector, also transitions to state 2.  In the next assessment, the 
systems transitions to state vector (3,1)k =s as shown in Figure 3.1c.  In Figure 3.1d, the 
systems have transitioned to state vectors (3,4) and then to its desired end state (5,5). 
The progress function ( )f ⋅  can be viewed as mapping the state vectors to 
bounded regions of the n-dimensional hypercube.  Let ,  n nyR y⊆ ∈  be a region of 
state vectors ks  such that all k yR∈s map to the same progress value py.  Then, Ok = py.  
Figure 3.2 depicts an example of three regions (y = 1, 2, 3) and their associated progress 
values.  In this example, the first state vector (0,0) is in Region 1.  The second state 
vector (2,2) is in Region 2.  The third state vector (3,1) returns to Region 1.  The fourth 
and fifth state vectors (3,4) and (5,5) are in Region 3.  Therefore, the values for Ok for 
each assessment corresponding to the state vectors in Figure 3.2 are as follows:  0.33, 
0.67, 0.33, 1.00, and 1.00.  Note that, by definition of Region 3, the desired end state 
vector {(3,3); (4,3); (5,3); (3,4); (4,4); (5,4); (3,5); (4,5); (5,5)}ek =s . 
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3.2.2 Relationship between System States and Assessment Indicators. 
For each state mqs  of system n[q], 
m
qs is defined by a function : q qg I S→  such that 
1 2( , ,..., )
m
q rs g i i i=  
where 1 2{ , ..., }rI i i i=  is a set of indicators i, {0,1}i∈ .  When a predefined number of 
indicators exists for a given state, 1 for some i i I= ∈ , n[q] is said to be in state mqs .  In 
Figure 3.3, the states are defined such that the system will transition in a series from the 
initial state 0s to the desired state es as a result of the friendly actions taken and enemy 
reactions. 
Using indicators to assess the state of the system of interest, assessors then use the 
changes in system states (the effects) to build the state vectors.  The state vectors are then 
used as inputs to the progress function.  Thus, this EBA construct builds upon the 








































Figure 3.2  Progress regions and py-values. 
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to perform these calculations, all the relevant parameters must be defined (i.e., the states 




ns s s   The remainder of 
the chapter describes how the planners and assessors develop the parameters beginning 
with the central piece of EBO, the effects. 
 
Figure 3.3  State transition diagram for system n[q] 
 
3.3 Seven-Phase EBA Methodology 
In order to apply the above theoretical construct to an operational environment, 
this thesis decomposes the EBA process into seven phases.  At any point in the process, 
planners and assessors can be simultaneously working in any of the phases.  The phases 
have a general chronological order with each phase producing material required in the 
subsequent phases.  However, unlike a rigid series of fixed steps, the phases can be 
revisited iteratively and in various orders to improve the EBA process and output. 
EBA is a vital and complementary part of EBP.  Planners and assessors work in 
concert to develop an assessable effects-based plan.  The EBA and EBP processes 
support and enhance each other; as the plan changes, the assessment plan also changes.  
Just as in EBP, much of the work described in the EBA phases should be accomplished 
s0 s1 se. . . 
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prior to the start of the Effects-Based Execution (EBE).  During combat operations, the 
elements of EBP and EBA are then subsequently altered as the campaign evolves. 
The phases of EBA are as follows: 
Phase I:  Desired Effect Definition.  For each operational-level effect, assessors 
and planners develop a statement completely describing the desired effect; this 
statement identifies the enemy system of interest, the initial state of the system, 
the desired end state of the system, and the start and end times of the state change. 
Phase II:  Indicator Development.  Planners and assessors develop a set of 
measurable indicators based on anticipated enemy system reactions to planned 
coalition actions and desired effects.  This thesis defines a measurable indicator as 
one that is observable and distinguishable.  Effects-tree diagrams are introduced  
to facilitate this phase. 
Phase III:  System State Definition.  The set of measurable indicators is 
partitioned into ordinal states that describe the system of interest as it reacts to 
friendly actions. 
Phase IV:  Actions Assessment.  Coalition actions are tracked using Measures of 
Performance (MOP), similar to those used in OIF, to track the CFACC actions.  
The MOPs are then plotted on a time axis to view trends. 
Phase V: Effects Assessment.  The indicators and MOPs are used as evidence for 
an assessment of the state of the systems of interest.  The resulting state of the 
systems is monitored over time to view trends towards the desired end state. 
Phase VI:  Objectives Assessment.  The progress function is defined by planners 
anticipating state vectors that will result from friendly actions.  As state vectors 
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are determined during EBE, the vectors are mapped to progress values according 
to this function. 
Phase VII:  Campaign Assessment.  Actions assessment, effects assessment, and 
objective assessment are brought together with the time dimension to observe 
how the enemy systems react to the friendly actions.  In this phase, assessors 
determine if the actions executed are achieving the desired effects and are 
accomplishing the CFACC objectives as planned. 
3.3.1 Phase I:  Precisely Defining Effects to be Assessable. 
Effects are the heart of EBO, and desired effects of friendly actions on the enemy 
are what direct the entire EBO process.  Effects direct the EBA portion of the process in 
two ways:  1) assessing the attainment of commander’s objectives is accomplished by 
assessing the achievement of a set of desired effects; 2) effects are used to derive 
indicators that determine the achievement of those effects.  Phase I lays out the 
specifications required of an effect definition so that the achievement of the effect can be 
accurately assessed. 
The EBA process begins with a set of CFACC objectives and a set of desired 
effects that must be achieved in order to attain the objectives.  For each objective, 
planners identify a set of effects that apply to that objective.  With regards to the 
overarching objective, the set of effects must be collectively exhaustive.  Put another 
way, for a given objective, there should exist an effect for each system that must undergo 
a state change.  These effects taken together completely describe everything that must 
occur to attain the objective.  The collectively exhaustive property enables the analytical 
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leap from effects achievement to objective attainment;  if all the effects have been 
achieved, then the objective has been attained. 
In order to assess the achievement of the effects, assessors must derive from the 
effects measurable indicators that give insight to the state of the system.  Indicators are 
evidence that a system state change has occurred.  A well-defined effect description 
guides the search for indicators so that assessors can track data representing the resulting 
system states after friendly actions have been executed.  In order to meet these 
assessment requirements, the effects must be clearly and precisely defined. 
Gallagher et al state that an effect is clearly and precisely defined when a desired 
functional capability or desired behavior along with a range, extent, start time and end 
time are specified (Gallagher, True, and Whiteman, 2004:9).  This thesis adds to these 
specifications the initial state of the system, the system state before any coalition actions 
are taken.  Therefore, for each effect,  planners and assessors need to define the following 
specifications:  
 System of interest;  this is what Gallagher et al describe as the range; a capability-
range is the affected area, such as target, city, region or state, whereas behavior-
range is the affected individual, group or nation (Gallagher, True, and Whiteman, 
2004:9); this specification answers the question “What system is to be affected?” 
 Initial State of the System; this specification is the baseline for comparison after 
coalition actions have been taken.  This specification answers the question “What 
is the beginning state of the system?”  To answer this question, enemy systems 
need to be tracked before conflict ensues.  Assessors may need to integrate 
historical data to establish performance norms of physical systems or behavioral 
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norms of human systems (Smith, 2002:397).  A quality SoSA model, should be 
able to provide input as to the initial states of the system as well. 
 Desired End State; this is what Gallagher et al describe as the Extent; the extent 
specifies the resulting level of capability or behavior—whether it is decreased, 
maintained or increased (Gallagher, True, and Whiteman, 2004:9); this 
specification answers the question “What is the desired change in 
capability/behavior of the system?’ 
 Start time; start time answers the question “When is the change to take place?” 
 End time; end time, when combined with start time, answers the question “How 
long does the effect last?” 
In conclusion, effects are well-defined when they are described by the system of 
interest, the initial state of the system, the desired end state, and start time and duration of 
the effect.  Effects defined this way will adequately support the assessment of the 
objective and the derivation of appropriate indicators. 
3.3.2 Phase II: Developing Measurable Indicators with Effects-Tree 
Diagrams. 
The hardest task of an assessment effort is determining what data is observable, 
obtainable by intelligence assets, and provides insight to the nature of the enemy’s 
capabilities and behavior.  How do analysts know if the effects are being achieved?  What 
indicators should be chosen?  What metrics should be used?  What intelligence options 
are available for data collection on the indicators?  How can more options be generated?  
One approach to determine the state of an enemy system (as discussed in Section 2.9) 
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includes an analysis of the most likely enemy reactions to friendly actions taken against 
enemy system nodes.  Phase III builds on this approach to generate a set of measurable 
indicators.  This thesis defines a measurable indicator as one that is observable and 
distinguishable.  Observable denotes the indicator is detectable by the intelligence assets 
available to the JFC, including but not limited to traditional ISR, open-source 
intelligence, SIGINT, HUMINT, ELINT, MASINT, etc.  Distinguishable denotes that 
when the indicator changes, the change is evident to the assessors.  For example, when 
assessing the combat strength of an enemy infantry division, the unit itself may be 
observable.  However, the particular strength of the unit may not be distinguishable; 
similarly, the unit may not actually be distinguishable from other enemy units.  
Conversely, the life status of an enemy leader (whether he is living or dead) is certainly 
distinguishable, but it may not be observable because his whereabouts are unknown. 
A difficult task for planners is determining the most likely effects to be generated 
by different courses of action.  For instance, destruction of a single node can 
simultaneously have indirect effects at all levels of warfare and across all types PMESII 
systems.  With  multiple layers of indirect effects, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
precisely predict enemy system reactions.  Historically, its been difficult to predict 
beyond third-order effects with any certainty (Smith, 2002:397; Mann, Endersby, and 
Searle, 2002:34, 39).  To overcome these challenges, this thesis introduces a tool called 
an effects-tree diagram.  This section will first describe the general form and construction 
of an effects-tree diagram and then follow with a detailed example. 
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3.3.2.1   Constructing Effects-Tree Diagrams. 
Developing an effects-tree diagram is similar to creating a cause-and-effect 
diagram, the quality control tool described in Section 2.8.  It is necessary to know both 
causes and effects in great detail and in concrete terms in order to illustrate their 
relationship and make  them useful (Ishikawa, 1989:18).  Effects-tree diagrams can be 
thought of as the reversal of cause-and-effect diagrams.  Cause-and-effects diagrams 
begin with a resulting effect and work backward to determine root causes.  Effects-tree 
diagrams begin with a military action against an enemy network node (a cause) and work 
forward to determine the resulting effects. 
Step 1 (Figure 3.4):  Determine the operational-level enemy system of interest to 
be diagramed.  Write the initial state s0 on the left side of the diagram and draw a box 
around it.  Similarly, write the desired state se on the right side of the diagram and draw a 
box around it.  Then draw an arrow from the initial state to the desired state.  This arrow 
represents the transition of the system from the initial state to the desired state. 
 
Figure 3.4  Effects-Tree Diagram Step 1 
Step 2 (Figure 3.5):  List any indicators of the initial and desired state that can be 
derived from the effect definition in Phase I.  Add these to the diagram by drawing a 
branch from the system state.  On this branch draw smaller branches containing the 
indicators.  Indicator branches are denoted by the circles on the branch.  It may be 
ses0
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necessary to list indirect effects of the system state in order to reach measurable 
indicators of the system state. 
 
Figure 3.5  Effects-Tree Diagram Step 2 
Step 3 (Figure 3.6):  Draw the planned friendly actions 1 2, ,..., nA A A , to be taken 
against the system with arrows directed to the shaft of the central arrow.  These actions 
are prescribed by the O-E-N-A-R chain resulting from EBP.  In effects-tree diagrams, 
these arrows represent causal linkages. 
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Step 4:  For each action, draw a branch of arrows down from the central line.  The 
vertical line of this branch represents the set of all indirect effects EI resulting from the 
achievement of the desired end state se.  The arrows represent enemy reactions (indirect 
effects EI) to the friendly action that resulted in the desired end state of the system. 
Assessors now consider the indirect effects that would be caused by each action 
taken in isolation.  That is, assume that action An is 100-percent successful at achieving 
the desired effect on the enemy system.  Assume no other friendly actions were taken, 
and the enemy system has transitioned to the desired end state se.  This is done for each 
action, hence a branch is drawn for the set of enemy reactions resulting from the desired 
state caused by each action as shown in Figure 3.7.  Assessors should consider the 
reaction of all nodes within the system as well as the reactions of other systems of the 
PMESII network connected to the system of interest.  To consider all potential enemy 
reactions, assessors assume that the enemy will continue to fight by all means available to 
him (reference Section 2.11).  With this assumption, an additional question for the 
assessors becomes “Given that action An alone causes the desired end state se, how does 
the enemy react in order to keep fighting?”  The answers to this question are then added 
to the diagram as arrow branches. 
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Figure 3.7  Effects-Tree Diagram Step 4 
Step 5 (Figure 3.8):  Adding branches to the diagram should lead to measurable 
indicators of the indirect effects 1 2, ,..., ri i i ; therefore assessors should continue adding 
branches until they reach measurable indicators.  Assessors must try to understand the 
cause-and-effect relationship as fully as possible and increase the number of sub-
branches by continually asking, “how does that action affect the system?  How would the 
system react?  How can the effect be observed?”  Planners and assessors must ask what 
else might happen, because in a complex system, no action ever creates a single outcome.  
There is always some other indirect effect to consider (Mann, Endersby, and Searle, 
2002:52).  It is important to note that to arrive at measurable indicators, several 
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Figure 3.8  Effects-Tree Diagram Step 5 
The effects-tree diagram helps organize and relate the impact of actions and their 
indirect effects to the rest of the enemy system.  The key to observing indirect effects in 
effects-tree diagrams is the reiteration of the questions How does that action affect the 
system?  How would the system react?  How can the effect be observed?  For each 
indirect effect generated, analysts need to expand the tree by answering these questions. 
For planning purposes, assessors should include as many relevant people as 
possible when building effects-tree diagrams.  Planners, assessors, and intelligence 
analysts should all be included in order to determine enemy reactions and indirect effects 
of an action. 
Assessors need to make an effects-tree diagram for each effect within a given 
objective.  Likewise, when the effects-tree diagram begins to reveal potential indicators, 
it is useful to classify the indicators by organizations that can provide the necessary data 
to perform the assessments process.  To this end, do not cut effects and potential 
ses0
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indicators because there is no known way to observe or quantify them.  Include all effects 
considered important for the action and desired effect, regardless of whether or not they 
are presently being measured or are capable of being measured;  these effects may still 
provide insight to planners after the measurable indicators have been chosen. 
When the diagram is complete, planners and assessors should have developed 
approximately 10 potential indicators for each desired effect.  A set of indicators of this 
size will enable partitioning the indicators into states in Phase III.  Keep in mind, 
however, that in practice, the total number of indicators capable of being tracked for an 
entire objective is around 50 to 60.  Note, a single indicator may provide evidence for 
multiple effects and should be used for as many effects as appropriate.  These indicators 
then need to be coordinated with the ISR division in order to make the indicators part of 
the overall ISR collection plan. 
3.3.2.2   Effects-Tree Diagram Example. 
The following example of an effects-tree diagram is based on a scenario of the 
notional country of Exstan.  As Exstani governance moves towards a stable democracy, 
the next round of  elections are planned to take place in six months.  As the elections get 
closer, terrorist attacks have increased in number and intensity.  The coalition has 
determined the following desired effect against Kobra, a ruthless terrorist organization 
determined to rule Exstan: 
 System of interest:  Kobra terrorist organization. 
 Initial State of the System:  3 Kobra Commander hideouts; 4 Kobra training 
camps; 10 other terror group bases sympathetic to Kobra; 15 air bases and 
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military storage facilities.  Kobra is capable of conducting as many as ten 
simultaneous attacks throughout the country with varying degrees of destruction 
and casualties. 
 Desired End State:  Kobra incapable to perform a single attack that results in 5 or 
more casualties. 
 Start time:  Effect to begin on or before D+15. 
 End time:  Effect not to end before D+195. 
The first step of the tree-diagram flows directly from the desired effect definition as seen 
in Figure 3.9. 
 
Figure 3.9  Effects-Tree Diagram Example—Step 1 
Figure 3.10 depicts the indicators that immediately come to mind to assess the 
state of Kobra.  Assessors often stop at this point when trying to determine success 
indicators for military actions.  However, tracking only one indicator to determine the 
effect of multiple military actions has two limitations:  1)  the indicator may not be 
measurable in practice; and 2)  the indicator may change based on other factors 
independent of friendly actions.  The first limitation could result in assessors having a 
non-observable indicator on which to base the assessment of an effect.  The second 
limitation could result in assessors making incorrect assessment based on what appears to 
be a direct causation.  In this example, the number of Kobra attacks will likely be affected 
by friendly actions, but Kobra attacks also may be affected by other factors internal to the 
Kobra combat
incapable for




to 10 terrorist 
attacks daily.
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Kobra organization.  Assessors want to know the impact of the synergy of friendly 
actions on the system and view how the system changes as a result of those actions.  
Developing multiple indicators will aid this goal. 
 
 
Figure 3.10  Effects-Tree Diagram Example—Step 2 
 
Step 3 (Figure 3.11) begins to look at the impact of each friendly action.  In this 
example, the planners have decided on a four actions against four separate subsystems of 
the Kobra terrorist organization:  neutralize command and control (C2) leadership; 
destroy Kobra sanctuary; destroy Kobra military equipment; and influence Kobra fielded 
forces to capitulate. 
 






































Figure 3.12 shows the initial branching of the diagram with a branch for each 
planned action against the system.  These branches represent the indirect effects resulting 
from the achievement of the desired effect given the action is successful in isolation from 
the other actions.  Figure 3.13 depicts the completion of the  effects branch with the 
“Neutralize C2 Leadership” branch, showing the anticipated indirect effects and their 
associated measurable indicators.  The full effects-tree diagram for this example is given 
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Table 3.1  Indicators Generated from Effects-Tree Diagram Example 
Neutralize C2 








Attacks/day decrease Increased use of 
improvised explosives 
Attacks/day decrease 
Decrease in press 
releases 
Decrease in press 
releases 
Decrease in attacks 
aimed at high 
casualties 
Decrease in press release 
New name/faces in 
press 
Increased traffic at 
borders 
Increase in attacks 
aimed at infrastructure 





Increased rhetoric in 
bordering countries 
Increased traffic at 
borders (smuggling) 
Increased attacks on high 
casualty targets 
Increase in number 
of isolated ops 
Increased use of 
alternate comm 





 Increased thefts from 
security forces 
Increased traffic to 
training camps 
   Small scale attacks 
   Increase web postings of 
suicide bombers 
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In Phase II, assessors make three crucial assumptions:  1) the action under 
consideration is 100-percent successful in creating the desired effect; 2) the action is the 
only action that has taken place to achieve the desired effect; 3) the enemy will continue 
to fight by any means necessary.  The first two assumptions are made in order to generate 
potential indirect effects and for that purpose alone.  They do not in any way represent 
the intentions of the planners that each action will be the sole means to achieve the 
desired effect.  By making these assumptions with each effect-tree diagram, assessors are 
able to generate a list of many possible enemy reactions that might result from each one 
of the friendly actions.  The assumptions alleviate the problem of determining the 
reactions from all possible actions simultaneously.  Viewing the enemy through these 
assumptions allows planners to conceive possible indirect effects one at a time. 
When the diagram is complete, the assessors will have a list of measurable 
indicators.  These indicators taken together represent how the enemy might react to all of 
the friendly actions executed in EBE.  Before execution, the assessors know with 
certainty neither how successful the friendly actions will be nor how the enemy will react 
to said actions.  The list of indicators then represents what might happen given any 
combination of friendly actions and enemy reactions.  Though developed under strict 
assumptions, each indicator combined with other indicators provides a range of possible 
enemy system reactions.  In the next phase, this range will be described qualitatively by a 
series of ordinal system states.  The set of indicators will then be partitioned according to 
these states. 
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3.3.3 Phase III:  Defining System States by Partitioning the Indicators. 
In order to track progress towards the achievement of a desired effect, the EBA 
process must track the state of the systems of interest as the systems’ state changes.  
Knowing the state of the system will give insight into the effectiveness of the actions 
taken.  The indicators developed in Phase II will be used for this purpose. 
In Phase I, the initial and desired end states of the system are defined.  However, 
other possible intermediate states are not always defined a priori as the initial and desired 
states are defined.  When this is the case, the intermediate states can be defined by 
partitioning the indicators.  The assessors can bin together indicators that represent 
similar levels of consequences under the same label to form an ordinal scale of system 
states.  The intermediate states are essentially pseudo states.  These pseudo states, while 
not precisely states of the system, are a collection of indicators by which assessors can 
measure progress towards the desired end state. 
Phase III describes two ways to partition the set of indicators into states.  Both 
methods place each indicator into a predefined state of ordinal consequences.  The first 
ordinal scale is the familiar stoplight-chart assessment states:  red, amber, and green.  The 
second scale is more detailed, consisting of five states.  This scale is similar to the 
consequence scale presented by Haimes in the Risk Filtering and Ranking Methodology 
for risk assessment (reference Section 2.13).  In the stoplight chart method for 
partitioning the indicators, each color of the stoplight—red, amber, and green—
represents a state of the system (Figure 3.14).  Red is the least desired state as defined by 
the commander, amber is a moderate or acceptable level given the progress of operations, 
and green is the desired end state.  Planners and assessors examine each indicator 
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developed in Phase II and determine which system state the indicator best represents.  
The mechanism for partitioning the indicators is the question “if this indicator occurs, 
what is the most likely state of the enemy system?” 
 
 
Figure 3.14  Stoplight Chart System States 
The five-state consequence scale (5S), pictured in Figure 3.15, is similar to the 
stoplight scale but has more intermediate states.  More states allows assessors to view 
progress over time more easily and gives a greater fidelity to the overall EBA process.  In 
the first state of 5S after actions have been taken, the system has undergone little or no 
change and is effectively still in 0s .  In the second state, the system has undergone some 
recognizable change but the function of the system is the same.  In the third state, the 
system has undergone a change and the system function has been altered to a noticeable 
degree.  In the fourth state, the system function has changed significantly, but the system 
is not yet in the desired state.  Finally, the fifth state is the desired end state of the system.  
Figure 3.15 summarizes example state descriptions for changes in capability and changes 
in behavior. 
Red Amber Green
System is still in the 
initial state or has 
undergone a  minor 
change. 
System has undergone 
a significant change. 
System is in the 
desired end state.
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When Phase III is complete, every indicator has been assigned to one of the 
defined states.  For a given effect, all indicators developed in Phase II must be attached to 
a state of the system, and every state must have at least one indicator.  If either condition 
is not met, Phase II may need to be revisited to generate more indicators, or the state 
descriptions need to be redefined to lessen the number of states.  The number of states 
may vary; this thesis only presents three-state and five-state models as examples.  Two-
state or four-state models may better represent the enemy system state transitions that 
result from friendly actions.  Assessors should readjust both the set of indicators and the 
ordinal scales of system states as necessary.  Remember, the goal of Phase III is to 
specify a set of states that the system will likely transition into as result of friendly 
actions, and to conduct an appropriate partitioning of the set of indicators to describe the 
conditions of each state.  As an example, consider the Exstan indicators.  Table 3.2 shows 
a partition of the indicators listed previously in Table 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.15  Five-State Transition Model for Capabilities and Behaviors 
Capability
S0:  Minor or no change in 
capability
S1:  Some change in capability; 
no effect on mission
S2:  Loss of capability with some 
effect on mission
S3:  Loss of mission
S4:  Complete loss of system 
capability or desired capability 
attained
Behavior
S0:  Minor or no change in 
behavior
S1:  Some change in behavior
S2:  Noticeable changes in 
behavior; other behaviors evident
S3:  Original behavior is ceased
S4:  Desired behavior
S1 S2 S3 S4S0
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Table 3.2  Example of Indicator Partitioning 
Kobra
ms  0s  1s  2s  3s  es  
State 
Description 
Little or no change 
in warfare methods  
Some change in  
methods with little or 
no effect on overall 
combat capability 
Significant change 
in methods  with 
some effect on 
combat capability  
Complete change in 
method 
Complete loss of 
combat capability 
Increased use of 
IEDs 
Decrease in press 
releases 
Increased threats 




New names and 
faces in leadership 
positions in press 
Decrease in attacks 
aimed at high 
casualties 
Decrease in number 







Increased use of 
alternate comm 
Increased attacks on 
high visibility targets 
Increased attacks on 
infrastructure 
Increased thefts 






Increased number of 
uncoordinated/isolated 
ops 









postings of suicide 
bombers 
  





   
Indicators 
 Increased traffic at the 
borders 
   
 
3.3.4 Phase IV:  Assessing Friendly Actions Taken against Enemy Systems.  
Phase IV describes the basic elements of assessing the completion of coalition 
actions prescribed by the COAs defined in EBP.  Tracking actions is nothing new.  The 
process described in this thesis is very similar to the process used in OIF to track the 
completion of CFACC tasks.  Essentially, assessors assign Measures of Performance 
(MOPs) to the actions and track the MOPs. 
For each action of an effect, planners have a set of action-node pairings.  The goal 
of the actions assessment is to determine if the action has been completed to the level 
required to produce the effect on the node.  In order to make this determination, assessors 
examine the nodes.  For each action-node pairing assessors develop MOPs. 
Combat actions often take on similar forms, and their associated MOPs are also 
similar.  Since MOPs have been used in the past, Phase IV can draw from the format of 
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past MOPs.  For example, actions of the type “destroy enemy nodes” can be measured 
with an MOP, “percent of enemy nodes destroyed.”  This MOP can then be assessed via a 
physical assessment.  In order to determine that enough enemy nodes have been 
destroyed, certain parameters are required.  Assessors must know the initial number of 
existing nodes and the number of nodes required to achieve the effect.  The initial number 
of existing nodes is called the baseline.  The number of nodes required to achieve the 
effect is called the goal level or target level.  It is possible, and often is the case, that 100 
percent of the enemy nodes need be destroyed in order to create the effect.  Sometimes, 
however, not all of the nodes need be destroyed.  Whatever the level of nodes needing to 
be destroyed, the assessors need to declare it. 
Thoele et al offer a short list of predefined MOPs based on coalition tasks in OIF 
(reference section 2.5).  Table 3.3 summarizes example actions and MOPs based on the 
OIF assessment model.  Once the MOPs have been defined, just as with the indicators in 
Phase II, the MOPs should be coordinated with the ISR division to acquire data for the 
baselines and target values as well as to develop a collection plan for tracking MOPs 
when combat operations commence.  
 
Table 3.3 Example MOPs for Friendly Actions (Thoele, DiSebastian, and Garcia, 2004) 
Coalition Action Example MOP 
Degrade/Disrupt/Destroy/Neutralize 
the enemy nodes 
Percentage of enemy nodes 
degraded, disrupted, destroyed, or 
neutralized 
Detect and Identify specific enemy 
capabilities (GPS jamming, etc.) 
Number of occurrences of enemy 
capability detected and identified 
Maintain 24-hour coverage or 
specific coalition capability 
Percentage of coverage or 
capability achieved over 24-hour 
period 
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In order to aid the planners, tracking the MOPs should include a time dimension 
in order to view trends.  That is, the level of the MOP should be plotted against a time 
axis for each day of the campaign (Figure 3.16).  The actions may also be assessed 
collectively.  To determine the accomplishment of a set of actions for an effect, a linear 
additive value function may be used wherein each action MOP is given a weight 
[0,1]w∈  as it applies to the effect and  1i
i
w =∑  .  Then the completion of all actions for 
an effect may be given by a value function 
i i
i
v w c=∑  
where wi is the weight of the action and ci is the level of completion of the action, 
[0,1]c∈ .  The value v can be plotted over time as well. 
 
































Assessing coalition actions is a necessary piece of EBA, answering the question 
“How well is the plan being executed?”  For each action, assessors can define MOPs 
based on previous assessment efforts or develop new MOPs appropriate for the COA.  
The MOPs can be tracked individually or aggregated as they support an effect.  To aid 
planners, the level of completion of the actions should be plotted in a graph against time 
to view developing trends.  The actions assessment will be used along with the effects 
assessment (Phase V) to build a campaign assessment chart in Phase VII. 
 
3.3.5 Phase V:  Assessing Effects based on Indicators of Enemy Reactions. 
As aforementioned, an effect is a change in state sΔ of an enemy system.  
Friendly actions are synchronized to produce the desired effect 
0 es s sΔ = →  
If the system state transitions are defined as 0 1 2 3s s s s→ → →  where s0 is the initial 
state and s3 is the desired state, the desired effect is  0 3s s sΔ = → .  However, any state 
change such as 0 1s s→  can also be viewed as an effect on the system.  By monitoring 
these changes in system states, assessors aim to view progress towards achieving the 
desired effects.  Therefore, assessors must determine the system states to determine 
which sΔ  has occurred. 
In order to determine what effects friendly actions have had on the system of 
interest, assessors need to determine the state of the system.  The state of the system can 
be described by the set of indicators defined in earlier phases of the EBA process.  More 
specifically, this relationship is described by the function :g I S→ such that  
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1 2( , ,... )
m
m rs g i i i=  
where and, 1 2{ , ..., }m rI i i i=  is a set of indicators i, {0,1}i∈ .   When a predefined number 
of indicators exists for a state ,ms S∈  then the system of interest n[q] is said to be in ms .  
Essentially, ( )g ⋅  is based on an assessment of whether or not enough evidence exists (via 
the indicators) to declare a system in a particular state.  To aid assessors, this thesis 
advocates the use of the 40-percent rule inspired by Powell (reference section 2.10). 
The forty-percent rule simply states that if assessors have evidence of at least 40 
percent of the indicators of a given state, then it is reasonable to conclude that the system 
is in that state.  In this method, the weight of each indicator is normalized with the other 
indicators within that state, so that each indicator provides equal weight of evidence for 
the state.  Therefore, the weight of an indicator is a function of the number of indicators 
in that state.  That is to say, if state A has more indicators assigned to it than state B, 
assessors will need to witness more of the indicators of state A to declare the system in 
state A than to declare it in state B.  This condition agrees with the logic used to create 
the indicators.  The assumption is that all indicators are equally likely to occur.  Given the 
coalition actions taken, it is not known with certainty how the system will react.  Thus the 
more indicators showing evidence of a system being in state ms  the greater the chance 
that the system is in that state. 
Using the 40-percent rule, assessors can reasonably conclude that the system 
resides in the highest state for which greater than or equal to 40 percent of its indicators 
have been observed.  (In this thesis, higher denotes a state that is closer to the desired 
state.)  Problems, however, arise when evidence exists for indicators in multiple states 
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and no state has evidence of 40 percent of its indicators, or when multiple states have 
evidence for greater than 40 percent of their indicators.  How then do assessors decide 
which state the system is in?  The question rephrased asks, “given the evidence of system 
indicators, what is the likelihood that the system is in a particular state?”  The following 
guidelines provide some answers to this question:   
1) The system has the highest likelihood of being in the state with the highest 
percentage of its indicators observed. 
2) If there is a tie in the percentage of observed indicators for multiple states, 
then it is more likely that the system is in the higher state.  This conclusion is 
based on the following assumptions:  given that the system is actually in the 
lower state, the likelihood of seeing the higher-state indicators is quite low.  
Conversely, given the system as actually in the higher state, the likelihood of 
seeing the lower-state indicators is high.  This assumption is based upon the 
fact that the coalition actions are designed to achieve the higher system states.  
Assessors expect the actions to achieve the higher states.  However, caution is 
warranted in this situation.  While the presence of an indicator in the higher 
state is evidence that the system may be in that state, without additional 
evidence it may be prudent to proceed as though the system is in the lower 
state until more evidence is available. 
3) If multiple states have evidence of more than 40 percent of the indicators, then 
it is more likely that the system is in the higher state.  (This is based on the 
same assumptions as number 2.) 
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As in all assessment efforts, however, the point of the guidelines are to provide insight.  
Subject-matter experts (SME)—i.e., system experts, intelligence operators, leadership 
with other sources of information—and operational knowledge gained from experience 
can trump the state assessment provided by the guidelines.  Likewise, in practice, actual 
enemy reactions may not correspond directly to the predefined indicators.  When this 
occurs, assessors can use Smith’s questions (reference Section 2.7.5) as catalysts for 
assessing the state of an enemy system.  Whether the assessment is made via the 
indicators, SME opinion, or ad hoc based on an unanticipated enemy reaction, the goal of 
Phase V is to determine the state of the systems of interest in terms of the desired effects.  
These state assessments will provide inputs to the objective progress function in Phase 
VI. 
3.3.6 Phase VI:  Assessing the Progress of the Objective based on the State of 
the Enemy Systems. 
In order to assess the progress of objective k, assessors need to define the progress 
function Ok for the objective.  Phase VI describes how to define this function.  First, the 
no-attainment and full-attainment regions are defined by two sets of state vectors.  These 
regions are the ones that map to p = 0 and p = 1 respectively.  Next, the remaining state 
vectors are binned together into a middle region for which the p-values will be later 
assigned.  Then, the projected progress curve is defined based on the time-series actions 
developed in EBP and the anticipated resulting state vectors.  The anticipated state 
vectors are assigned p-values based on planners’ input.  Finally, as the campaign is 
executed and assessments are made regarding the states of the systems, those states are 
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assigned approximate p-values via pair-wise comparisons with the existing state vectors, 
thus completing the progress function. 
The no-attainment and full-attainment regions correspond to the red and green 
states of a stoplight chart.  Using the stoplight-chart nomenclature works particularly well 
in an operational setting as commanders are used to seeing operational objectives 
described in terms of red, amber, and green (reference Section 2.5).  To map state vectors 
to the green and red regions, assessors need only choose those vectors which describe full 
attainment of the objective and those that describe no attainment of the objective.  There 
will always be at least one vector in each of these regions; the vector 0 0 01 2( , ,..., )ns s s  in the 
red region, and the vector 1 2( , ,..., )
e e e
ns s s  in the green region.  The red and green regions 
are then assigned the p-values 0 and 1 respectively. Any vectors not mapped to red and 
green regions fall into the amber region by default. 
Assessors next build a progress curve based on the planned time-phase actions 
and anticipated enemy system states resulting from those actions as described in EBP.  
The end points of the progress curve can be derived directly from the definition of the 
desired effect from Phase I.  At the start of the campaign (D+0), all systems are in their 
initial states.  Likewise, the desired end state of a system is planned to be achieved by the 
start date from the desired effect definition.  Figure 3.17 illustrates the following 
example:  Let objective k have two systems of interest, each with five possible states 
(including the initial state).  In this example, the desired end state for both systems is to 
start on D+5.  The planners anticipate that after the first day of the campaign, both of the 
enemy systems will have transitioned into state two.  Similarly, after three days of the 
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campaign, both systems will have transitioned into state three.  Therefore, the planners 
have anticipated that the vector states will transition as follows: 
(0,0) (2,2) (3,3) (4,4)→ → →  
The question the assessors must then ask the planners is “how much of the objective will 
be attained at each of the anticipated state vectors?”  In this example, the planners think 
approximately 30 percent of the objective will be attained after the first day (state vector 
(2,2)).  Likewise, approximately 70 percent of the objective will be attained after the third 
day (state vector (3,3)).  The state vectors can then plotted on a timeline against the 
percentage of the objective attained.  Connecting the points then results in an a progress 
curve for which assessors can compare the assessed progress as EBE commences during 
Phase VII.  Figure 3.17 helps illustrate this process. 
 
 



























The assigned levels of attainment for the anticipated state vectors begin the 




Figure 3.18  Progress Function After Initial Mappings of State Vectors 
 
At this point, only a fraction of the possible state vectors have been mapped to 
progress values:  the no-attainment vectors (p = 0), the full attainment vectors (p = 1), 
and the anticipated state vectors that the planners have mapped to approximate p-values.  
The final item in this phase is to map the remaining state vectors to p-values.  Put another 
way,  for each state vector ks , assessors assign ks  to a value ( )kf s  on the “percent of 
objective attainment” line. 
Mapping all possible state vectors, however, may be intractable.  Even for a small 
number of systems and the associated system states, for each system q, the number of 

































∏ .  From the earlier 
example in Section 3.2.1, with two systems having six states each (including the initial 
state), nk = 2 and mq = 6 for all q, which yields 6 6 36× =  different state vectors that need 
to be considered.  As nk and mq increase, the number of state vectors could quickly 
explode. 
This state vector explosion problem is not intractable.  With an initial progress 
function defined, all that is required is to map the state vectors that occur as a result of 
friendly actions during EBE when they occur.  That is, as assessors determine the states 
of the systems of interest, they need only determine in which interval of the progress 
function the vector belongs and approximate the value associated with it.  Again, the 
purpose of the progress function is to show progress towards the attainment of the 
objective.  Exact measurements are not as important as ordinal relationships; assessors 
need only to know approximate relationships between the state vectors to determine if the 
commander is getting closer to objective attainment or further away from it.  Another 
example helps illustrate this point.  Let the state vector (3,1) be the vector assessed after 
the first day of the campaign.  Then assessors must map (3,1) to a p-value.  Figure 3.19 
shows that the planners have determined that (3,1) yields attainment of the objective 
somewhere between (2,2) and (3,3), closer to (3,3) than to (2,2).  Furthermore the 
planners determine the level objective attainment to be about 55%, or a p-value of 0.55.  
The assessors can then add to the categorical progress function as shown in Figure 3.20. 
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Figure 3.19  Mapping new state vectors individually 
 
 
Figure 3.20  Discrete progress function after first day of campaign. 
 
3.3.7 Phase VII:  Campaign Assessment. 
Phase VII combines the results of Phases IV, V, and VI with the time dimension.  
Phase VII allows planners and assessors to view the objective attainment and actions 
accomplishment over time to get an overall picture of the evolution of the entire 
campaign.  The planners chose the actions in order to achieve the desired effects and 
attain the objectives.  In this phase, assessors can view whether the enemy is responding 
(2,2) (3,3) (4,4)(0,0) (3,1)
































as expected to the friendly actions as well as view whether or not the effects are being 
achieved in the planned timeframe. 
If the effects have been achieved yet the actions have not been accomplished, or if 
the actions have been accomplished and the effects have not yet been achieved, then 
important questions need to be investigated.  In either case, the relationship between the 
actions and effects is in question.  The SoSA model may need to be reconsidered, as well 
as the knowledge of the enemy, the indicators, and actions chosen by the planners.  
Figure 3.21 illustrates an example view of objectives versus actions over time. 
Plotting the levels of action completion versus the objective attainment can 
provide insight by describing the relationships between the actions and effects.  As in 
Figure 3.22, a general form of a functional relationship may be able to be determined.  If 
the plot looks like line A then the CFACC is experiencing diminishing returns on the 
actions taken.  Line B represents a linear relationship between the CFACC’s actions and 
the effects.  Line C shows the CFACC experiencing increasing returns on his actions.  
Graphs such as these can help planners adjust weights of effort to support lagging effects 
and objectives.  Regression analysis could also be used to look at the contribution of the 




Figure 3.21  Effects and Actions over Time 
 
   
 
Figure 3.22  Objectives vs Actions Graph 
 
Defining a planned progress curve in Phase VI allows assessors to compare the 









































and commanders can see when progress shortfalls have taken place and adjust future 
plans accordingly.  Figure 3.23 builds on the example from Section 3.3.6.  In this 
example the friendly actions taken have produced state vector (3,1) on campaign day 
D+1, and state vector (3,2) on D+3 and D+5.  As these state vectors occur, planners rate 
them according to their approximate attainment of the objective—(3,1) rates 55 percent 
attainment and (3,2) rates 60 percent attainment.  When compared to the planned 
progress curve, planners and assessors can see that the progress was ahead of schedule on 
D+1 but then fell behind schedule for the remaining assessment days.  Assessors can then 
investigate the actions accomplished on those days along with the effects achieved to 
determine the cause of the progress shortfall.  Planners can then adjust the plan to return 
to schedule, adjust the schedule, or determine another course of action as needed. 
 
































In summary, campaign assessment combines actions assessment, effects 
assessment, and objective assessment in the temporal domain to determine how the 
effects respond to the actions taken.  Plotting the objectives and actions together can 
reveal this relationship.  Likewise, plotting the planned progress curves versus the actual 
progress curves can reveal important insight to planners and commanders. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The goal of EBA is to provide insight to commanders and planners about 
coalition actions, enemy reactions, achievement of effects, and attainment of objectives.  
The mathematical construct described in the first part of the chapter defines the progress 
function, states, state vectors, and regions in order to provide the foundation for 
implementation of the EBA methodology.  In order to be useful in an operational 
environment, assessors must work with planners from the beginning of EBP to create an 
assessable plan.  Using the tools and methods described in the second part of the chapter, 
assessors and planners can develop a set of indicators to determine the states of systems, 
which represent achievement of effects.  These effects can then be mapped to quantities 
via a progress function defined with input from the planners.  Effects and actions can be 
tracked over time to view trends.  Taken together, the actions, effects, objectives, and 
time provide commanders and planners with an insightful model of the battlespace. 
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4 Results and Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 applies the methodology presented in Chapter 3 to two scenarios.  The 
first scenario is based on Operation DENY FORCE, which describes a notional combat 
operations air campaign set in 2010.  The original scenario was developed for the purpose 
of the Dynamic Air & Space Effects-Based Assessment (DASEA) critical experiment  
(McCrabb, 2005:1).  The second scenario describes a notional stability operations 
campaign developed by the author for the purpose of this thesis.  Though the focus of 
Chapter 3 was on assessing the effects of combat operations, the phases of the Effects-
Based Assessment (EBA) methodology are intended to be general enough to be applied 
to objectives and desired effects for stability operations as well. 
Both scenarios are presented in the same general format.  First, the general 
background of the scenario and the operational objectives are presented.  Next, the first 
three phases of the EBA methodology are presented along with actions-assessment 
preparation and objective and campaign-assessment preparation for each objective.  
Then, the Effects-Based Execution (EBE) of the campaign is briefly described, followed 
by the last four phases of the EBA methodology. 
4.2 Operation DENY FORCE 
US intelligence agencies have been monitoring reports that Orangeland (OL), 
which the US considers a “rogue state” in the region, has taken steps to obtain weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD).  OL has long viewed the US and its allies as adversaries, 
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while the US allies in the region look to the US for security.  Increasing evidence exists 
indicating that OL is developing WMD, especially research and development into 
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the deployment of those weapons on 
theater ballistic missiles (TBM).  Ongoing US diplomatic efforts have openly and 
vigorously protested OL activities.  However, these efforts have been largely 
unsuccessful as OL denies all accusations involving WMD.  Meanwhile, terrorists in the 
US have executed multiple chemical attacks in various US cities.  SECDEF has ordered 
the Combined Forces Commander (CFC) to begin contingency planning against OL with 
the goal of  “compel[ling]  Orangeland to stop WMD or TBM/CM development or 
employment activities” (McCrabb, 2005:2).  This operation is called OPERATION 
DENY FORCE (ODF).  The CFC has given the Combined Forces Air Component 
Commander (CFACC) the following operational objectives: 
Objective 1:  Gain and maintain air superiority. 
Objective 2:  Stop WMD activities of OL leadership. 
4.2.1 ODF Objective 1. 
The first three phases of the EBA methodology, along with actions-assessment 
preparation and objective and campaign-assessment preparation are presented for 
Objective 1:  Gain and maintain air superiority. 
4.2.1.1 Phase I:  Desired Effect Definition. 
For Objective 1 (Gain and maintain air superiority) the planners define two 
desired effects. 
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Desired Effect 1.1: 
 System of interest:  Airspace within Orangeland Theater of Operation (OLTO). 
 Initial State of the System:  OL possesses seven OL military air bases, conducting 
less than 25 training and combat sorties per month.  The overall operational 
capability of OL aviation is assessed as low, posing little threat to coalition forces.  
Two major civilian airports have combined air traffic that accounts for 10 to 12 
flights per day. 
 Desired End State:  OL experiences complete loss of air sovereignty.  No OL  
aviation traffic without the explicit permission of coalition forces; “if it flies it 
dies.”  In addition, Coalition forces have freedom of access for follow-on 
persistence forces. 
  Start time:  Effect to begin on or before D+2. 
 End time:  Indefinite; effect to be maintained as required by CFC. 
Desired Effect 1.2: 
 System of interest:  OL Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS). 
 Initial State of the System:  OL possesses approximately 200 Surface to Air 
Missiles (SAM) and 150 Early Warning (EW) and Ground Control Intercept 
(GCI) radars.  The overall capability of the surface-to-air threat is assessed as 
medium.  Primary concerns are concentrated strategic SAMs around OL’s capital 
and large numbers of unlocated tactical SAMs throughout OLTO. 
 Desired End State:  IADS threat to coalition forces neutralized. 
 Start time:  Effect to begin D+1. 
 End time:  Indefinite; effect to be maintained as long as required by CFC. 
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4.2.1.2 Phase II:  Indicator Development. 
The initial analysis for Desired Effect 1.2 is presented before Desired Effect 1.1 
because Desired Effect 1.2 is expected to contribute to Desired Effect 1.1. 
Planners determine four actions to be taken in order to achieve Desired Effect 1.2: 
 Destroy IADS Command and Control (C2) facilities. 
 Destroy EW/GCI radars. 
 Destroy IADS communications facilities. 
 Destroy SAM sites. 
Figure 4.1 depicts the effects-tree diagram used to develop a set of measurable indicators 
of the desired effect.  Multiple actions will result in the system reaction of  a decrease in 
the number of Surface-to-Air Fires (SAFIRES).  The effects-tree analysis results in six 










































Desired Effect 1.2 (IADS neutralized) is the primary mechanism by which 
planners aim to achieve Desired Effect 1.1 (Air Superiority).  Desired Effect 1.1 can be 
viewed as an indirect or secondary effect of achieving Desired Effect 1.2.  Figure 4.2 
depicts the effects-tree diagram resulting in the indicators given that IADS have been 
neutralized.  The effects-tree diagram reveals the undesired collateral effect that OL 
reacts to the coalition air strikes by using civilian air craft as WMD.  Since this issue is 
made known before EBE has commenced, the planners can revisit the planned Course of 
Action (COA) and determine if additional or different actions are required to mitigate the 
likelihood of OL using civilian aircraft as an offensive weapon.  For example, an action 
such as “destroy OL airfield takeoff capability” might negate this collateral effect.  Figure 
4.2 yields eight unique indicators to determine the state of the air space in the OLTO.  
Notice that the indicator “No SAFIRES” is an indicator for both Desired Effect 1.1 and 
Desired Effect 1.2. 
 
 
Figure 4.2  Effects-Tree Diagram for ODF Desired Effect 1.1 
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In general, indicators may overlap the desired effects.  That is, the same indicator 
may be seen in more than one desired effect as is the case with “No SAFIRES” for 
Desired Effects 1.1 and 1.2.  In practice, a single indicator may represent evidence for 
system states of multiple systems.  This phenomena is due to the holistic understanding 
inherent in EBO.  Indirect effects may cascade throughout the enemy systems, resulting 
in similar effects on a single system.  This phenomena can aid assessors by producing an 
efficient set of indicators, however it can also hinder assessors by adding a factor of 
uncertainty to the assessment effort. 
When the desired effects have a cumulative relationship as is the case above, the 
assessors can learn the states of multiple systems with fewer indicators, saving time and 
focusing valuable intelligence resources.  However, if the desired effects are not 
components of the same causal linkage or the same chain of effects, the same indicator 
used as evidence for states of multiple systems causes the indicator to be worth less as 
evidence of an individual system state.  This is due to the multiple factors contributing to 
the indicator from multiple lines of effects.  As with the Jones Criteria (reference Section 
2.6), the weights of the indicators depend on their relative occurrence as a result of each 
of the indirect effects.  For example, an indicator that is anticipated to appear as result of 
an effect on system A, and only system A, is given more weight as evidence of that effect 
than an indicator that could appear as a result of an effect on system A or as a result of an 
effect on system B.  Therefore, while having the same indicators represent evidence for 
states of multiple systems may appear to be more efficient, the information gained may 
actually be more uncertain, because assessors do not know the true cause of the indicator.  
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Assessors should therefore strive to determine other unique indicators for each effect on 
separate causal linkages.  Ideally, assessors will be able to determine the states of the 
operational-level systems with approximately 50-60 indicators (reference Section 2.5).  If 
the number of indicators greatly exceeds the 50-60 range, a filtering process may need to 
be employed to keep the assessment process manageable. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the resulting indicators for Desired Effects 1.1 and 1.2. 
 
 
Table 4.1  List of indicators for ODF Desired Effects 1.1 and 1.2 
IADS Neutralized OL loses air sovereignty/Coalition forces have freedom of movement 
Decrease in SAFIRES Increased OL sortie rates 
No SAFIRES Civ a/c fly unusual patterns 
Decrease in radar emissions Civ a/c fly unscheduled flight plans 
Ballistic SAFIRES Increased traffic away from WMD/C2 
facilities 
Decrease in comm. emissions Decreased traffic towards WMD/C2 
facilities 
No radar emissions No SAFIRES 
 No OL a/c airborne 
 OL a/c engage Coalition forces 
 
4.2.1.3 Phase III:  System State Definition. 
The initial states of the OLTO and IADS systems s0 = 0 0OLTO IADS( , )s s and the 
desired states of the systems se = e eOLTO IADS( , )s s flow directly from the effects definition of 
Phase I and the effects-tree diagrams of Phase II.  For each effect of Objective 1, the state 
transitions are represented with a three-state model.  The indicators are partitioned 
accordingly.  As stated in Chapter 3, this phase may require a trial-and-error approach to 
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determine the appropriate number of states and indicators for those states.  Table 4.2 and 
Table 4.3 show the states and indicators decided upon by the assessors and planners in 
this scenario. 
Table 4.2  Three-state model and indicators for ODF Desired Effect 1.2 
IADS
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change in IADS 
capability or behavior. 
IADS undergone a 
significant change. 
IADS threat to coalition 
forces neutralized. 
Guided SAFIRES Decrease in SAFIRES No SAFIRES 
 Decreased radar emissions Ballistic SAFIRES 
Indicators 
 Decreased comm. emissions No radar emissions 
 
Table 4.3  Three-state model and indicators for ODF Desired Effect 1.1 
OLTO
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
(Given IADS neutralized) 
OL a/c able and willing to 
contest coalition forces. 
OL a/c contest Coalition 
forces indirectly. 
OL experiences complete loss 
of air sovereignty and 
coalition forces have freedom 
of access for follow-on 
persistence forces. 
Increased sortie rates Civilian a/c engage in 
unscheduled or unexpected 
flights 
No SAFIRES 
OL a/c engage Coalition 
forces 
Civilian a/c fly unusual flight 
patterns No airborne OL a/c 
Indicators 
 Mobile SAMs positioned 
near high-priority assets 
Coalition forces uncontested 
in OL airspace 
 
4.2.1.4 Actions Assessment Preparation. 
The planners have identified four actions (see Section 4.2.1.2) to be taken in order 
to achieve both desired effects; the desired effect on the OL IADS is intended to have a 
cumulative effect resulting in the desired effect on the OLTO airspace.  The actions 
chosen are all kinetic strikes on the IADS.  Therefore, assessors choose the Measures of 
Performance (MOP) to be the percentage of targets destroyed.  The planners set the target 
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number for the planned actions—the required percentage of targets to be destroyed—at 
80 percent.  That is, planners believe that at least 80 percent of the actions must be 
completed in order to achieve the desired effect on the OL IADS and the OLTO airspace.  
These actions will be tracked as EBE commences to determine their level of 
accomplishment. 
4.2.1.5 Objective and Campaign Assessment Preparation. 
Assessors and planners develop an initial progress function based on the planned 
COA and anticipated level of objective attainment.  The plan-line for the COA and 
anticipated objective achievement is shown in Figure 4.3.  The initial progress function is 
depicted in Figure 4.4.  For both examples presented in Chapter 4, it is implied that the 
current system states, effects achievement, objective attainment, and task 
accomplishment will each be assessed following the campaign day on which the actions 
took place.  To aid discussion, this thesis will refer to the assessments made after the 
actions on day D+x as assessments at D+x. 
For example, in Figure 4.3, the state vector (1,1), which corresponds to 
1 1
OLTO IADS( , )s s , is anticipated to be reached at D+0 (after the actions of D+0).  Planners 
determine that state vector (1,1) will yield approximately 80 percent of the overall 
objective attainment.  State vector (2,2), which corresponds to e eOLTO IADS( , )s s , is 
anticipated to be reached at D+1 (after actions on D+1) and yield 100-percent attainment 
of the objective. 
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4.2.2 ODF Objective 2. 
The first three phases along with actions-assessment preparation and objective 
and campaign-assessment preparation are presented for Objective 2:  Stop WMD 
activities of OL leadership. 
4.2.2.1  Phase I:  Effects Definition. 
For Objective 2 (Stop WMD activities of OL leadership), the planners define 
three desired effects. 
Desired Effect 2.1: 
• System of interest:  Orangeland leadership. 
• Initial State of the System:  OL denies all WMD accusations and unwilling to 
consider diplomatic negotiations.  OL willing to use TBM/WMD rather than lose 
all of their current WMD capability as a result of coalition attacks; “use or lose” 
mindset. 
• Desired End State:  OL leadership views WMD assets as “at risk” with a 
moderate likelihood of losing all WMD capability.  OL would rather  negotiate 
terms for disarming WMD capability and ceasing WMD ambitions than lose any 
more capability; “negotiate or lose” mindset. 
•  Start time:  Effect to begin on or before D+5. 
• End time:  Indefinite; effect to be maintained as long as required by CFC. 
Desired Effect 2.2: 
• System of interest:  OL WMD Research and Development (R&D) facilities. 
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• Initial State of the System:  Seven active chemical and biological R&D facilities 
and one nuclear R&D facility located throughout the country are currently 
operating at full capacity. 
• Desired End State:  No chemical/biological weapon R&D facilities operating at 
full-capacity.  Facilities not to sustain irreparable damage;  the operating level of 
all the facilities is to be degraded to less-than-full capacity. 
•  Start time:  Effect to begin on or before D+1. 
• End time:  Effect not to end before D+10. 
Desired Effect 2.3: 
•  System of interest:  OL WMD deployment systems. 
•  Initial State of the System:  Three deployment facilities have the capability to 
place WMD warheads on TBMs. 
•  Desired End State:  These facilities physically and functionally destroyed. 
• Start time:  Effect to begin on or before D+4. 
• End time:  Effect not to end before D+10. 
4.2.2.2 Phase II:  Indicator Development. 
Planners determine three actions to be taken in order to achieve a tactical effect 
(Electrical power disrupted at WMD R&D facilities) that will achieve Desired Effect 2.2 
(Production disrupted at WMD R&D facilities): 
 Disrupt Petroleum, Oil and Lubrication (POL) lines for backup EP outlets. 
 Disrupt backup EP generators. 
 Disrupt Electrical Power (EP) substations. 
110 
Figure 4.5 depicts the effects-tree diagram used to develop a set of measurable indicators 
for Desired Effect 2.2.  This phase results in seven measurable indicators (as shown in 
Table 4.4) that will be used to determine the state of the WMD R&D facilities. 
 For Desired Effect 2.3, the planners determine four actions and two tactical 
effects required to achieve “WMD deployment capability disrupted.”   
 Destroy relay stations. 
 Disrupt OL telecommunications (tactical effect). 
 Destroy fiber optic cable lines for EP plants. 
 Disrupt OL Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) systems for 
EP (tactical effect). 
 Destroy WMD storage facilities. 
 Destroy POL for WMD units. 
This effects-tree diagram pictured in Figure 4.6 results in seven measurable indicators 
that will be used to determine the state of the WMD deployment facilities.  The effects-
tree diagram also reveals four potential indicators that assessors deem unmeasurable, 
indicated by the dashed lines.  Recall from Chapter 3 that an indicator must be observable 
and distinguishable in order to be measurable.  Note that the indicators developed for 
Desired Effects 2.2 and 2.3 connote that ISR assets should be focused on the lines of 
communication (LOC) associated with the WMD R&D and deployment facilities. 
Desired Effect 2.1 is a cumulative effect resulting from the achievement of 
Desired Effects 2.2 and 2.3.  The effects-tree diagram pictured in Figure 4.7 yields 12 
measurable indicators for Desired Effect 2.1.  These indicators involve a variety of 
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systems, including LOCs, military defense systems, diplomatic channels, TBM launch 
systems, and international terrorist activities. 
 
 
Figure 4.5  Effects-tree diagram for ODF Desired Effect 2.2 
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Table 4.4 summarizes the indicators developed in Phase II for Desired Effects 2.1, 2.2, 
and 2.3. 
Table 4.4  List of indicators for ODF Desired Effects 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 
DE 2.1  OL leadership views 
WMD “at risk;” would rather 
negotiate than lose all WMD 
assets 
DE 2.2  Production at WMD 
R&D facilities disrupted 
DE 2.3  WMD deployment 
capability disrupted 
Increased heavy equipment traffic 
in/out of WMD facilities 
Decreased traffic to facilities Increased heavy equipment traffic 
at WMD deployment sites 
Military defenses relocated to 
WMD R&D facilities 
Increased heavy-equipment traffic 
to and from facilities 
Fires and explosions at WMD 
deployment sites 
OL emplaces civilians IVO WMD 
sites 
Local blackout around R&D 
facilities 
Increased traffic out of/ decreased 
traffic to WMD deployment sites 
OL publicizes civilian 
consequences (blackouts to 
hospitals/schools, casualties etc.) 
Lights stay out at R&D facilities 
while power returns to surrounding 
area 
OL forces evacuate WMD 
deployment sites* 
OL issues a demarche against US Explosions, fires at R&D facilities OL forces garrison at WMD 
deployment sites* 
OL initiates diplomacy via third 
party 
Increased security at WMD R&D 
facilities 
Increased cell phone use 
OL launches TBM into own 
territory 
Mobile SAM IVO WMD R&D 
facilities 
Increased radio use 
OL launches TBM at Coalition 
forces 
 Increased SATCOM use 
OL launches TBM at neighboring 
countries 
 OL use courier to communicate* 
Increased terrorist attacks in 
US/Coalition allies 
 Unexplained civilian casualties* 
Terrorist attacks in neighboring 
countries 
  
OL civilian a/c used as WMD 
(flying irregular patterns/times) 
 
* unmeasurable indicator 
 
 
4.2.2.3 Phase III:  System State Definition. 
The initial states of the systems and the desired states of the systems flow directly 
from the effects definition and the effects-tree diagrams.  The state transitions for Desired 
Effect 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 are represented by a four-state model, a two-state model, and a 
three-state model respectively.  Tables 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 show the states and indicators 
decided upon by the assessors and planners. 
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Table 4.5  State Transitions and Indicators for ODF Desired Effect 2.1 
OL
ms  0s  1s  2s  es  
State Description 




Little bit better.. System unable to 
perform mission. 
OL launches TBM at 
Coalition forces 
OL civilian a/c used 
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OL initiates diplomacy 
via third party 
Increased terrorist 
attacks in US/Coalition 
allies 
OL launches TBM 
into own territory 
Increased heavy 
equipment traffic 




Terrorist attacks in 
neighboring countries 
   
 
 
Table 4.6  State Transitions and Indicators for ODF Desired Effect 2.2 
WMD R&D
ms  0s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change to system 
function. 
System unable to perform 
mission. 
Increased heavy-equipment 
traffic to and from facilities 
Local blackout around R&D 
facilities 
Increased security at WMD 
R&D facilities 
Lights stay out at R&D 
facilities while power returns 
to surrounding area 
Mobile SAM IVO WMD 
R&D facilities 
Decreased traffic to facilities 
 
Indicators 




4.2.2.4 Actions Assessment Preparation. 
The planners have identified a total of seven actions (see Section 4.2.2.2) to be 
taken in order to achieve the three desired effects associated with Objective 2.  Again, the 
actions are all kinetic strikes.  Therefore, assessors choose the percentage of the targets 
destroyed as the MOPs for the actions.  Due to the precision nature of the planned 
friendly actions, the planners set the target number for the planned actions at 100 percent.  
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Every specified target needs to be successfully acted upon to achieve the desired effect.  
Note that the WMD R&D facilities are not targeted directly; only the support systems 
feeding the R&D facilities, illustrating the precision nature of the strikes.  These actions 
will be tracked as EBE commences to determine their level of accomplishment. 
 
Table 4.7  State Transitions and Indicators for ODF Desired Effect 2.3 
WMD Dep
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change to system 
function. 
System functionality affected. System unable to perform 
mission. 
Increased heavy equipment 
traffic at WMD deployment 
sites 
Increased cell phone use  Fires and explosions at WMD 
deployment sites 
Increased traffic out of/ 
decreased traffic to WMD 
deployment sites 
Increased radio use OL forces evacuate WMD 
deployment sites* 
OL forces garrison at WMD 
deployment sites* 
Increased SATCOM use  
Indicators 





* unmeasurable indicator 
 
4.2.2.5 Objective Assessment Preparation. 
Assessors and planners next develop an initial progress function based on the 
planned COA and anticipated level of objective attainment.  The plan-line for the COA 
and anticipated objective achievement for Objective 2 is shown in Figure 4.8.  The initial 
progress function, derived from the planned progress line, is depicted in Figure 4.9. 
The state vector OL WMD R&D WMD Dep( , , )
m m ms s s represents the states of the systems of 
interest and is translated by the following vectors in the planned progress line and 
progress function:  the state vector (0,1,1) is anticipated to be reached at D+0 and yield 
approximately 20 percent of the overall objective attainment.  State vector (1,1,1) is 
anticipated to be reached at D+2 yielding 30 percent of objective attainment.  State vector 
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(0,1,2) is anticipated to be reached at D+3.  This state vector represents full achievement 
of Desired Effect 2.2, partial achievement of Desired Effect 2.3, and no achievement of 
Desired Effect 2.1, which is a return to the initial state of the OL leadership.  This plan 
results from the planners’ forecast that OL will have an undesired reaction to coalition air 
strikes and will likely fire a TBM at its neighbors.  Per the effect definitions, state vector 
(3,1,2), representing the achievement of all the desired effects associated with this 
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Figure 4.9  Initial Progress Function for ODF Objective 2 
4.2.3 Post Effects-Based Execution of ODF. 
To describe the assessment methodology more fully, this section details the EBA 
process as EBE commences.  Chapter 4 examines the ODF scenario at D+0 (D-Day) and 
at D+4 with the aim of showing enough assessment detail to demonstrate the 
methodology.  For the interested reader, the observed indicators and daily cumulative 
actions accomplishment for the remaining campaign days are given in Appendix B. 
4.2.3.1 Phase IV:  Actions Assessment. 
At D+0, strike results are mixed.  Physical, functional, and system assessments 
reveal that the overall actions accomplishment is about 60 percent.  Figure 4.10 lists the 
accomplishment of each action individually.  As stated above, the planners determined 
that approximately 80 percent of the IADS targets needed to be successfully serviced to 
achieve Desired Effects 1.1 and 1.2.  Similarly, to achieve Desired Effects 2.1, 2.2, and 




























facilities need to be successfully serviced.  Therefore, at D+0, coalition forces are closer 
to accomplishing the actions associated with the IADS systems than they are to 
accomplishing the actions associated with the WMD and OL systems. 
4.2.3.2 Phase V: Effects Assessment. 
At D+0, some planned indicators are not being seen at all and some other planned 
indicators are returning ambiguous information.  Tables 4.8 through 4.12 highlight in 
gray the indicators triggered by the available intelligence data.  Table 4.8 (Desired Effect 
1.2) illustrates that no SAFIRES were reported during the first day of air strikes, 
indicating that the IADS system might already be in the desired state. 
 
Figure 4.10  ODF Actions Accomplishment at D+0 
 




























D+0 0.64 0.70 0.62 0.63 0.57 0.67 0.70 0.50 0.58 0.55 0.68
Mean 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62


























Little or no change in 
IADS capability or 
behavior. 
IADS undergone a 
significant change. 
IADS threat to 
coalition forces 
neutralized. 
Guided SAFIRES Decrease in SAFIRES No SAFIRES 
 Decreased radar emissions Ballistic SAFIRES Indicators 
 Decreased comm. emissions No radar emissions 
 
Table 4.9 (Desired Effect 1.1) illustrates similar indications (no SAFIRES, coalition 
forces uncontested in OL airspace, and no OL aircraft attempt to get airborne), placing 
OLTO airspace in the desired state as well. 
 












OL a/c able and willing 
to contest coalition 
forces. 




complete loss of air 
sovereignty and 
coalition forces have 
freedom of access for 
follow-on persistence 
forces. 





OL a/c engage 
Coalition forces 
Civilian a/c fly unusual 
flight patterns 
No OL a/c fly w/o 
explicit approval from 
Coalition forces 




uncontested in OL 
airspace 
Indicators 
 Decreased traffic 
towards WMD/C2 
facilities 
No airborne OL a/c 
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In Table 4.10 (Desired Effect 2.2), assessors see the desired state se for the WMD R&D 
facilities with two indicators of that state, a local blackout around the facilities and power 
returning to surrounding areas but not the R&D facilities. 
 
Table 4.10  Desired Effect 2.2, WMD R&D Facility Indicators at D+0 
WMD R&D
ms  0s  es  
State 
Description 
Little or no change to system 
function. 
System unable to perform mission. 
Increased heavy-equipment traffic to 
and from facilities 
Local blackout around R&D facilities 
Increased security at WMD R&D 
facilities 
Lights stay out at R&D facilities while 
power returns to surrounding area 
Mobile SAM IVO WMD R&D 
facilities 
Decreased traffic to facilities 
 
Indicators 
 Explosions, fires at R&D facilities 
 
In Table 4.11 (Desired Effect 2.3), assessors have witnessed indicators of two states, s1 
and se.  Neither state has the prerequisite 40 percent of indicators observed, therefore the 
assessors must carefully consider the implications of the indicators. Using the guidelines 
for determining the system states, the assessors conclude that the system is most likely in 
the desired state, however since less than 60 percent of the actions against this system 
have been accomplished, the planners decide to declare the system in s1. 
Table 4.12 (Desired Effect 2.1) illustrates that OL launched TBMs at both 




Table 4.11  Desired Effect 2.3, WMD Deployment Capability Indicators at D+0 
WMD dep
is  0s  1s  es  
State Description Little or no change to system function. 
System functionality 
affected. 
System unable to 
perform mission. 
Increased heavy 
equipment traffic at 
WMD deployment sites 
Increased cell phone 
use  
Fires and explosions at 
WMD deployment sites 
Increased traffic out of/ 
decreased traffic to 
WMD deployment sites 
Increased radio use OL forces evacuate 
WMD deployment 
sites* 





No activity at WMD 
deployment sites. 
Indicators 





Table 4.12  Desired Effect 2.1, OL Leadership Indicators at D+0 
OL
ms  0s  1s  2s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change 
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4.2.3.3 Phases VI and VII:  Objective and Campaign Assessment. 
After considering all the system states, the assessors determine the state vectors at 
D+0 to be (2,2) for Objective 1 and (0,1,1) for Objective 2.  Both state vectors have 
already been mapped to progress values via the progress function (reference Sections 
4.2.1.5 and 4.2.2.5).  Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 illustrate the actual progress line versus 
the planned progress line at D+0 for Objectives 1 and 2. 
 
 
Figure 4.11  Actual Progress Line for Objective 1 at ODF D+0 
 
This scenario now jumps ahead to the assessments at D+4.  The cumulative 
actions accomplishment, current progress functions, and progress curves are shown as 
they exist at D+4 in order to illustrate how the assessment of ODF has changed over the 
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Figure 4.12  Actual Progress Line for Objective 2 at ODF D+0 
 
Figure 4.13 depicts the levels of action accomplishment at D+4.  Of the eleven 
actions, only three have reached their assigned target levels.  The effects of these actions 
are shown in Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15.  The progress function for Objective 1 (Figure 
4.14) has been updated as the state vectors (0,1) and (1,2) have been observed via the 
indicators.  Objective 1 returns to full attainment at D+4 having previously dipped to only 
30 percent attainment at D+2.  The updated progress function for Objective 2 (Figure 
4.15) contains the state vectors that have been observed.  All of the state vectors mapped 
to progress values by the planners are listed in increasing order of progress as follows:  
(0,0,0), (0,1,1), (1,0,2), (1,1,0), (1.1.1), (0,1,2), (2,1,1), and (3,1,2).  Objective 2 has not 
progressed as positively as Objective 1 with an approximate progress of just over 20 
percent objective attainment.  Though the actions have not been fully accomplished for 
































The planners must take this into consideration when deciding on the next actions to 
execute. 
At D+4 it appears that Objective 1 is on plan while Objective 2 is lagging.  The 
CFACC and planners will take this into consideration for future COAs.  As the air 
campaign progresses, the progress function and progress line will continue to be updated 
according to the assessment of the effects. 
 
 
Figure 4.13  Task Accomplishment at D+4 




























D+4 0.78 0.74 0.72 0.71 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.88 1.00 0.85 0.80
Mean 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84





















Figure 4.15  ODF Objective 2 Progress Function and Progress at D+5 
 
4.3 Operation CLOSE GAP 
Before the dictatorial rule of Syrpentor in Exstan, the Exstani education system 
was a highly regarded learning institution.  Under the Syrpentor regime, public funds 
were siphoned off for military expenditures and other regime priorities.  This shortage of 
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control over the curriculum, teachers, and administration, propelled the education system 
into a steady decline.  The recent conflict that liberated the Exstani people compounded 
twenty years of neglect, leaving the education system virtually defunct.  Nearly, all 
primary and secondary educational facilities require significant reconstruction.  As 
Exstani governance moves towards a stable democracy, the demands on the US-lead 
coalition remain great.  As a part of an overall campaign of stability operations, the 
Coalition has the following operational objective for the education system: 
Objective 1:  Improve quality and access to education. 
4.3.1 Phase I: Desired Effect Definition. 
For Objective 1, the planners define two desired effects. 
Desired Effect 1: 
• System of interest:  Exstani school-age children. 
• Initial State of the System:  Few students attend school regularly due to limited 
availability of schools/teachers and limited access to school supplies. 
• Desired End State:  National education enrollment and attendance returned to pre-
regime levels. 
• Start time:  24 months from start of program. 
• End time:  Indefinite. 
Desired Effect 2: 
• System of interest:  Exstan Education Infrastructure. 
• Initial State of the System:  Educational facilities at all levels are in shambles and 
are in dire need of repair.  Few schools are open full-time due to lack of qualified 
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teachers and administrators.  The schools that are open have no common text 
books or other learning materials. 
• Desired End State:  Infrastructure meets basic standards and provides basic 
educational supplies and tools for all schools nationwide. 
•  Start time:  24 months from start of program. 
• End time:  Indefinite. 
4.3.2 Phase II:  Indicator Development. 
In Phase II, assessors analyze Desired Effect 2 before Desired Effect 1 because 
Desired Effect 2 is expected to have a cumulative effect contributing to Desired Effect 1.  
Planners determine seven actions to be taken in order to achieve Desired Effect 2: 
 Rehabilitate substandard schools. 
 Build new schools. 
 Provide all schools with potable water and sanitation facilities. 
 Train new teachers and administrators. 
 Distribute desks and chalkboards to all schools. 
 Distribute new math and science text books to all schools. 
 Distribute sports equipment to all schools. 
Figure 4.16 depicts the effects-tree diagram used to develop a set of measurable 
indicators for Desired Effect 2.  Multiple actions are anticipated to result in similar 
system reactions.  The effects-tree analysis results in 19 unique indicators that will be 
used to determine the state of the education infrastructure (shown in Table 4.13). 
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Using a similar process, Figure 4.17 illustrates the effects-tree diagram used to 
determine measurable indicators for Desired Effect 1.  To build this effects-tree diagram, 
planners examine the COA, which includes four actions to be taken and one operational 
effect to be achieved in order to achieve Desired Effect 1: 
 Establish model schools as “Centers of Excellence.” 
 Enroll out-of-school children in accelerated programs. 
 Develop and broadcast early childhood television series promoting education. 
 Education Infrastructure meets basic standards and provides basic educational 
supplies and tools for all schools nationwide (Desired Effect 2). 
Again, multiple actions are anticipated to result in similar system reactions.  This effects-
tree analysis results in 13 unique indicators that will be used to determine the state of the 
Exstani school-age children (shown in Table 4.13). 
This example illustrates two advantages over assessing combat operations.  First, 
there is no enemy per se trying to deceive or conceal capabilities from coalition forces.  
Therefore, the systems needing to be monitored in order to measure the indicators are 
assumed to be easier to track.  Second (and somewhat related), the desired effects in this 
example lend themselves to being measured directly.  That is, the best indicators of the 
desired effects are the systems of interest themselves.  For example, in Desired Effect 1 
(enrollment and attendance return to pre-regime levels), assessors can track the number 
of students enrolled directly in order to determine the state of the system.  Likewise, for 
Desired Effect 2 (infrastructure meets basic standards), assessors can track the 
educational facilities directly to determine the state of the education infrastructure. 
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Figure 4.16  Effects-Tree Diagram for OCG Desired Effect 2 
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Figure 4.17  Effects-Tree Diagram for OCG Desired Effect 1 
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4.3.3 Phase III:  System State Definition. 
The initial states of the systems and the desired states of the systems flow directly 
from the effects definition and the effects-tree diagrams.  Assessors aim to develop a 
state-transition model where each state has three to four indicators.  This will provide the 
property of the model that at least two indicators need to be witnessed to meet the 40-
percent rule.  In this example, assessors represent the state transitions for Desired Effect 1 
and 2 with a three-state model and a four-state model respectively.  In this example, the 
number of indicators developed would allow the assessors to model the systems with 
more states if necessary.  Tables 4.14 and 4.15 show the states and indicators decided 
upon by the assessors and planners.  Again, assessors see that some indicators are 
evidence for multiple systems.  Since the effects in OCG are along the same line of 
effects (one desired effect is to result as a cumulative effect of another) this provides the 
assessors with some efficiency in the set of indicators. 
4.3.4 Actions Assessment Preparation. 
The planners have identified 11 actions to be taken and one operational desired 
effect (see Section 4.3.2) to be achieved in order to achieve both desired effects.  The 
desired effect on the Educational Infrastructure is intended to have a cumulative effect 
resulting in the desired effect on the Exstani school-aged children.  After examining the 
actions, the assessors determine the MOPs to be the following: 
 Percentage of required substandard schools rehabilitated. 
 Percentage of required new schools built. 
 Percentage  of schools with potable water and sanitation facilities. 
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 Percentage of required new teachers and administrators trained. 
 Percentage of required desks and chalkboards distributed. 
 Percentage of required new math and science text books distributed. 
 Percentage of required sports equipment distributed. 
 Percentage of required “Centers of Excellence” completed. 
 Percentage of required out-of-school children enrolled in accelerated programs. 
 Early childhood television series broadcasting on Exstani television stations. 
 Education Infrastructure (Desired Effect 2) measured via the effects assessment.  
The planners set the target number for the planned actions at 100 percent.  That is, 
planners believe that all planned actions must be accomplished completely, meeting all 
required numbers in order to achieve the desired effects.  These actions will be tracked as 
EBE commences to determine their level of accomplishment. 
4.3.5 Objective and Campaign Assessment Preparation. 
Assessors and planners next develop a progress function based on the planned 
actions and anticipated levels of objective attainment.  The planned progress line for the 
planned COA is shown in Figure 4.18.  The initial progress function is depicted in Figure 
4.19. 
The state vector (1,1), which corresponds to 1 1Students Infrastructure( , )s s , is anticipated to 
be reached six months after the program begins and yield approximately 20 percent of the 
overall objective attainment.  State vector (2,2), which corresponds to 2 2Students Infrastructure( , )s s , 
is anticipated to be reached 18 months after the program begins and yield approximately 
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60 percent attainment of the objective.  The full attainment of the objective, state vector 
(2,3), is expected to be reached 24 months after the program begins. 
 
 
Table 4.13  Indicators for OCG Desired Effects1 and 2 
DE 1  Enrollment and attendance to 
pre-war levels. DE 2  Infrastructure is sound. 
Administrators/teachers hold workshops 
and seminars to share best practices 
Schools hiring maintenance staff Increase in number of teacher and 
administrator applications 
Waiting lists develop for model schools Increase in enrollment Schools open full time 
Decrease in behavioral problems Schools used as community centers Higher math and science test scores 
Increase in regular attendance Increase in attendance in poor 
metropolitan areas 
Math/science activities develop (fairs, 
competitions, etc.) 
Decrease in dropout rates Increase in enrollment in rural areas Education facilities not in use 
Higher standardized test scores Decrease in crime/vandalism in and 
around schools 
All Ed facilities fully operational 
Higher grades Interscholastic athletic competitions 
develop 
Schools at full capacity for students 
Increased enrollment Schools initiate sports programs  
Development of sports, clubs, and after-
school activities. 
Schools develop PE curriculum  
Attendance at desired level Decrease in preventable illnesses in 
children 
 
Enrollment at desired level Increase attendance across the board  
No change or drop in enrollment Schools fully staffed  
 
No change or drop in regular attendance   
 
 
4.3.6 Post Effects-Based Execution. 
The OCG scenario is examined in this chapter after 18 months of stability 
operations have been executed.  The actions and effects assessments after six months and 





Table 4.14  State Transitions and Indicators for OCG Desired Effect 1 
Students
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change 
to enrollment and 
attendance. 
Noticeable increase 
in enrollment and 
attendance. 
System at desired 
levels. 
Decrease in behavioral 
problems 
Development of sports, 
clubs, and after-school 
activities. 
Enrollment at desired 
level. 
Higher standardized test 
scores 
Waiting lists develop for 
model schools 
Attendance at desired 
level. 
Higher grades Administrators/teachers 
hold workshops and 
seminars to share best 
practices 
Decrease in dropout rates 
No change or drop in 
enrollment 




No change or drop in 
regular attendance 
Increased enrollment  
 
 
Table 4.15  State Transitions and Indicators for OCG Desired Effect 2 
Infrastructure
ms  0s  1s  2s  es  
State Description 



















Schools used as 
community centers 













and around schools 
Schools develop PE 
curriculum 
Higher math and 
science test 
scores 
Schools open full time 










Schools fully staffed 
  Increase 
attendance across 
the board 
Schools at full 
capacity for students 
Indicators 







































































4.3.7 Phase IV:  Actions Assessment. 
Figure 4.20 depicts the cumulative levels of action accomplishment after 18 
months.  The actions are being accomplished as planned.  Of the eleven actions, four 
have effectively reached 100-percent accomplishment, while the others have all been 




Figure 4.20  OCG Actions Accomplishment at 18 Months 
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4.3.8 Phase V:  Effects Assessment. 
After 18 months of stability operations, assessors have indicators of increased 
performance of students in the classroom, the development of extracurricular activities, 
and an increase of regular attendance of students, but not increased enrollment.  The 
infrastructure appears to be strengthening as the schools are fully staffed, with an increase 
in qualified applicants for teaching and administration positions, and the need to hire 
additional maintenance staff.  The indicators observed by the assessors are given in 
Tables 4.16 and 4.17. 
 
 
Table 4.16  Student Enrollment Indicators at 18 Months 
Students
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change 
to enrollment and 
attendance. 
Noticeable increase 
in enrollment and 
attendance. 
System at desired 
levels.. 
Decrease in behavioral 
problems 
Development of sports, 
clubs, and after-school 
activities. 
Enrollment at desired 
level. 
Higher standardized test 
scores 
Waiting lists develop for 
model schools 
Attendance at desired 
level. 
Higher grades Administrators/teachers 
hold workshops and 
seminars to share best 
practices 
Decrease in dropout rates 





Increased enrollment  
 
 
The assessors see that for Desired Effect 1, there are two indicators of system state s1 and 
one indicator for system state s0.  1s  has two out of five indicators observed; using the 
40-percent-rule, the assessors deem the student enrollment to be in 1s . 
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Table 4.17  Education Infrastructure at 18 Months 
Infrastructure
ms  0s  1s  2s  es  
State Description 



















Schools used as 
community centers 













and around schools 
Schools develop PE 
curriculum 
Higher math and 
science test 
scores 
Schools open full time 










Schools fully staffed 
  Increase 
attendance across 
the board 
Schools at full 
capacity for students 
Indicators 




Looking at the Education Infrastructure system, assessors see that the schools are 
fully staffed, however, assessors note that there are two indicators present for system 
state 2s .  Likewise the schools are not yet to full capacity for students, and some facilities 
are either not yet fully operational or not yet open full-time.  Therefore, the assessors 
declare that the education infrastructure is in system state 2s . 
4.3.9 Phases VI and VII:  Objective and Campaign Assessment. 
The resulting state vector from the indicator analysis is 1 2Students Infrastructure( , )s s , which 
is denoted (1,2).  The planners have mapped state vector (1,2) to approximately 60 
percent on the progress function.  Figure 4.21 lists the progress function at the 18-month 
assessment.  From the assessment at 12 months, this state vector represents a decrease in 
progress (Figure 4.22). 
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The assessors attribute this decrease in progress to the fact that the student enrollment had 
reached pre-regime levels at the 12-month assessment (reference Appendix C), but the 
number of students enrolled has actually decreased since then.  The reason for the 
unexpected decrease is unknown and warrants further investigation by the assessors. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In Chapter 4, EBA methodology was applied to two scenarios.  The first scenario 
described how EBA can be implemented to assess an air campaign involving combat 
operations.  The second scenario described how EBA can be applied to a nation-building 
campaign involving stability operations.  Though the combat operations and stability 
operations have very different aims, the EBA methodology presented in this thesis can 
provide insight for each case into the accomplishment of planned actions, the 
achievement of desired effects, the attainment of objectives, and the progress of the 
overall campaign.  Chapter 5, will discuss the advantages of this EBA methodology as 
applied to these two scenarios as well as some limitations of the methodology when it is 




Chapter 5 summarizes the results, contributions, and recommendations for future 
research of the Effects-Based Assessment (EBA) methodology presented in this thesis.  
The results discussed include the applicability and limitations of the EBA methodology to 
combat and stability operations.  The primary  recommendation of this thesis for future 
research are applications of stochastic analysis methods to the problem of EBA. 
5.2 Results of the Research 
This thesis set out to formulate an EBA construct that is timely, accurate, 
actionable, efficient, simple, quantifiable, adaptable, and most importantly, provides 
relevant insight to the CFACC and military planners.  Chapter 4 demonstrated how the 
EBA methodology can be applied to both combat operations and stability operations.  
However, the application of the EBA methodology does not produce equivalent results 
for both types of operations. 
When comparing the process of applying the EBA methodology to OPERATION 
DENY FORCE (ODF) and the process of applying the methodology to OPERATION 
CLOSE GAP (OCG), tracking the effects for ODF was more direct than tracking the 
effects for OCG.  In OCG, the desired effects of the stability operations lent themselves 
to being tracked more easily by monitoring the systems of interest directly.  In ODF, the 
systems involved included softer, human systems, which are inherently harder to monitor.  
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The desired effects in ODF therefore had to be largely monitored indirectly.  It is in this 
example that the methodology proved its worth. 
The main contributor to the method’s applicability is the development of  
indicators in Phase II.  When the system state can be measured directly, a formal 
methodology for determining system state indicators is not necessarily required.  One 
need not watch for “red faced” people to determine the outside temperature if a 
thermometer were available.  The same holds true for EBA.  If a system can be measured 
directly, there is no need to go through the effects-tree analysis described in Phase II.  
The use of direct metrics would be more efficient and more appropriate than proxy 
indicators when the system can be measured directly  Additionally, an added level of 
uncertainty accompanies the process when measuring systems indirectly.  For example, 
“red faced” people may be an indicator of temperature, but it could also be an indicator of 
a state of embarrassment. 
In Phase II, additional indicators of indirect effects are developed under a strict 
assumption about the enemy:  the enemy will continue to fight by all means available to 
him (reference Section 2.11).  Under this assumption, assessors can consider how 
individual friendly actions affect the enemy; these individual considerations then lead to a 
range of potential system reactions that describe all possible states of the system.  This 
range or enemy reactions is vital to the fidelity of effects assessment and system state 
definition in Phase III.   
In stability operations, however, there is not always an enemy per se.  In the OCG 
scenario (reference Section 4.3) there is no enemy that continues to fight by all means 
available.  Therefore, for the purposes of the effects-tree diagram, the assumption about 
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the enemy is violated.  This violation can result in a very narrow range of indirect effects 
produced by friendly actions, which in turn can result in a very narrow range of 
indicators.  A narrow range of indicators leads to a less robust range of ordinal system 
states produced in Phase III, which results in a set of system states that do not completely 
represent the system as it transitions as a result of friendly actions.  Ultimately, the 
differences in state vectors become more difficult to distinguish, which then makes the 
assessed progress of the objectives less insightful. 
In summary, the EBA methodology presented in this thesis can be used to assess 
combat operations and stability operations, however, the methodology is most useful 
when assessing combat operations involving systems that cannot be assessed directly. 
5.3 Contributions of the Research 
This thesis advances the application of EBA by defining anticipated states of 
enemy systems, developing indicators to determine the state of enemy systems, and 
applying progress functions to the anticipated and desired states of the enemy systems in 
order to describe progress of the campaign towards attainment of the commander’s 
objectives. 
Defining effects as a change in a system state formulates the EBA problem in 
terms that allow for the application of more robust modeling techniques.  Defining 
system states allows planners and assessors to model effects (model in the general sense) 
by considering a system’s transitions from an initial state to a desired state.  System states 
offer assessors a more tangible method for assessing effects.  When effects are described 
in terms of system states, the planners consider actions to induce a system to transition 
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into a desired state.  Assessors then consider evidence of the system state.  This is more 
robust than physical and functional assessments, because it explicitly takes into account 
the indirect effects influenced by the system states.  These indirect effects are at the heart 
of the operational value of EBO. 
Similarly, the deliberate and methodical development of indicators contributes to 
both planning and assessing effects-based operations.   EBO is about effects; as such the 
EBO process should include a method wherein planners and assessors consider the direct 
and indirect effects of planned and executed military actions.  The effects-tree diagram 
provides a means to accomplish this consideration.  The effects-tree diagram combines  
the system states and planned friendly actions to generate a list of indirect effects.  These 
indirect effects aid the planners by helping them determine potential collateral effects of 
the actions, potential unforeseen enemy reactions which can be mitigated by additional or 
different actions, and can highlight deficiencies in branch plans and sequels.  Effects-tree 
diagrams aid assessors by leading to measurable indicators of indirect effects, which in 
turn can be used to describe enemy system states that represent the achievement of 
desired effects. 
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
This thesis offers two main suggestions for future research:  methods to define 
system states directly, prior to developing indicators; and the use of stochastic modeling 
methods to determine current and future states of enemy systems.  Phase III develops 
states by partitioning as set of indicators that describes a range of potential enemy system 
reactions.  Another approach is to determine the intermediate states along with the initial 
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state and desired state of the system before developing indicators.  This could be done 
through analysis of the SoSA model or by a method similar to Gallagher’s specifications 
for a precisely defined effect.  Additional specifications could include items that describe 
intermediate states witnessed through combat modeling and systems-of-systems analysis. 
Smith describes the second avenue for future research, which involves the 
development of collections and indications algorithms similar to indications and warning 
intelligence used during the Cold War era.  These algorithms were developed to yield an 
overall probability of an enemy attack.  A general process would nominate indicators, 
apply weights to those indicators and assemble the various inputs into a “coherent 
probabilistic understanding” of the nature of an enemy’s behavior (Smith, 2002:382, 
398).  Stochastic methods exist to produce this coherent probabilistic understanding.  One 
such method is the use of Hidden Markov Models (HMM).   HMMs are widely used in 
speech recognition and the comparing of protein sequences.  HMMs have also been 
applied to problems of conflict detection, failure analysis, medical diagnosis, knowledge 
assessment, and pattern recognition.   
An HMM is variation of a Markov chain model.  HMMs consist of a set of 
discrete states and a matrix { }ijp=P  of transition probabilities for a system moving from 
state i to state j.  In addition, every state has a vector of observed symbol (or indicator) 
probabilities, { ( )}ji k=I  that corresponds to the probability that the system will produce 
a symbol of type k when the system is in state j.  Furthermore, the states cannot be 
directly observed and can only be determined  from the indicators, ergo the term 
“hidden” (Schrodt, 1997:12). 
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This description of HMMs aligns well with the Phase V method of using 
indicators to determine system states presented in this thesis.  To apply HMM to EBA, 
assessors would need to assign the state transition probabilities and the indicator 
probabilities, which is no small task.  The benefit would be that HMMs would help 
answer questions such as “given a set of observed indicators, what is the most likely state 
of the system?” and “what state is the system most likely to transition to?”  Further 
research into the applicability of HMMs to EBO could lead to more insightful 
assessments, which may include a methodology for predicting future states of enemy 
systems, a capability highly sought after by planners looking days and weeks ahead of 
current operations.  Rabiner (1989) and Schrodt (1997) offer a baseline for HMMs; 
Falmagne and Doignon (1988) describe a similar procedure using finite Markov chains 
for assessing system states.  
5.5 Conclusion 
The EBA methodology presented in this thesis takes a big step towards complete 
operational implementation of EBO.  As demonstrated in Chapter 4,  the seven-phase 
EBA methodology can be applied to combat operations as well as stability operations, 
though it is suited best for combat operations where the systems of interest cannot be 
assessed directly.  The contributions of the EBA construct presented here include the 
definition of enemy system states to be tracked as the systems change in order to 
determine achievement of desired effects; the development of indicators of system states 
using effects-tree diagrams; and the mapping of the system state vectors to approximate 
values of objective attainment via progress functions.  Formulating desired effects in 
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terms of system state transitions and using indicators to determine those states opens two 
areas for future research:  defining the system states directly along with the initial state 
and desired end state of the system, and the use of Hidden Markov Models to determine 
the most likely system state and most likely future state given a set of observed 
indicators.  In time, the EBA paradigm presented here, combined with further research, 
doctrinal development, and operational experience, will increase the crucial insight to 
commanders into the complex effects created by friendly actions on the battlespace and 
the enemy. 
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Appendix A  Effects-Tree Diagram Example 
 
Figure A.1  Effects-Tree Diagram Example (reference Section 3.3.2.2) 
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Appendix B  OPERATION DENY FORCE Data 
Appendix B presents the data used to make the assessments in the OPERATION 
DENY FORCE (ODF) scenario in Chapter 4.  The daily cumulative actions 
accomplishment are presented here for campaign days D+1 through D+3, and the 
observed indicators are presented for campaign days D+1 through D+4. 
B.1  ODF at D+1 
 Figure B.1 illustrates the cumulative actions accomplishment at D+1.  The mean 
accomplishment for all actions is 69 percent. 
 
 




























D+1 0.66 0.70 0.68 0.65 0.71 0.67 0.70 0.75 0.67 0.70 0.68
Mean 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69
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It is anticipated that Desired Effect 1.2 (IADS neutralized) will be achieved when 80 
percent of the actions taken against the IADS are accomplished.  The other actions must 
be 100 percent accomplished. 
Tables B.1 and B.2 illustrate the indicators observed by ISR assets at D+1 for the 
desired effects of Objective 1.  For Desired Effects 1.1 and 1.2, assessors determine that 
the occurrence of “No SAFIRES” puts the both the OLTO airspace and the IADS in 
desired state se.  Therefore, the assessed state vector for Objective 1 is (2,2). 
 
Table B.1  ODF Desired Effect 1.1, OLTO Indicators at D+1 
OLTO
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
(Given IADS neutralized) 
OL a/c able and willing to 
contest coalition forces. 
OL a/c contest Coalition 
forces indirectly. 
OL experiences complete loss 
of air sovereignty and 
coalition forces have freedom 
of access for follow-on 
persistence forces. 
Increased sortie rates Civilian a/c engage in 
unscheduled or unexpected 
flights 
No SAFIRES 
OL a/c engage Coalition 
forces 
Civilian a/c fly unusual flight 
patterns No airborne OL a/c 
Indicators 
 Mobile SAMs positioned 
near high-priority assets 
Coalition forces uncontested 
in OL airspace 
 
 
Table B.2  ODF Desired Effect 1.2, IADS Indicators at D+1 
IADS
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change in IADS 
capability or behavior. 
IADS undergone a 
significant change. 
IADS threat to coalition 
forces neutralized. 
Guided SAFIRES Decrease in SAFIRES No SAFIRES 
 Decreased radar emissions Ballistic SAFIRES 
Indicators 
 Decreased comm. emissions No radar emissions 
 
Tables B.3 through B.5 illustrate the indicators observed for the desired effects of 
Objective 2.  For Desired Effect 2.1 (Table B.3), the only indicator observed of the OL 
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leadership reaction is a protest against Coalition actions issued through a third-party 
embassy.  OL still denies any WMD activity.  Therefore, assessors determine the OL 
leadership to be in the initial state s0 because the disposition of the OL leadership has not 
changed.  For Desired Effect 2.2 (Table B.4), assessors determine the WMD R&D 
facilities to be in the desired state se due to the explosions at the R&D facilities, and 
because the power is still out at the facilities while it has returned to the surrounding area.  
Likewise, assessors determine the WMD deployment facilities to be in the desired state se 
due to seeing one-third of the indicators for the desired state, which is a greater 
proportion than the indicators for system state s1.  Therefore, the state vector for 
Objective 2 is (0,1,2). 
 
Table B.3  ODF Desired Effect 2.1, OL Leadership Indicators at D+1 
OL
ms  0s  1s  2s  es  
State Description 




Little bit better.. System unable to 
perform mission. 
OL launches TBM at 
Coalition forces 
OL civilian a/c used 






OL issues a demarche 
against US 











OL initiates diplomacy 
via third party 
Increased terrorist 
attacks in US/Coalition 
allies 
OL launches TBM 
into own territory 
Increased heavy 
equipment traffic 




Terrorist attacks in 
neighboring countries 







Table B.4  ODF Desired Effect 2.2, WMD R&D Indicators at D+1 
WMD R&D
ms  0s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change to system 
function. 
System unable to perform 
mission. 
Increased heavy-equipment 
traffic to and from facilities 
Local blackout around R&D 
facilities 
Increased security at WMD 
R&D facilities 
Lights stay out at R&D 
facilities while power returns 
to surrounding area 
Mobile SAM IVO WMD 
R&D facilities 
Decreased traffic to facilities 
 
Indicators 




Table B.5  ODF Desired Effect 2.3, WMD Deployment Indicators at D+1 
WMD Dep
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change to system 
function. 
System functionality affected. System unable to perform 
mission. 
Increased heavy equipment 
traffic at WMD deployment 
sites 
Increased cell phone use  Fires and explosions at WMD 
deployment sites 
Increased traffic out of/ 
decreased traffic to WMD 
deployment sites 
Increased radio use OL forces evacuate WMD 
deployment sites* 
OL forces garrison at WMD 
deployment sites* 
Increased SATCOM use  
Indicators 





* unmeasurable indicator 
 
B.2  ODF at D+2 
 Figure B.2 illustrates the cumulative actions accomplishment at D+2.  The mean 
accomplishment for all actions is 78 percent.  All actions associated with the IADS have 
achieved above 70 percent, as have all other actions.  The actions against the EP 
generators feeding the WMD R&D facilities have been 100 percent accomplished.
 Tables B.6 and B.7 illustrate the indicators observed by ISR assets at D+2 for the 
desired effects of Objective 1.  For Desired Effects 1.1, assessors observe two indicators 
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of state s0.   For Desired Effect 1.2, assessors observe all the indicators of state s1.  
Therefore, the assessed state vector for Objective 1 is (0,1). 
 
 
Figure B.2  ODF Actions Accomplishment at D+2 
 
 
Table B.6  ODF Desired Effect 1.1, OLTO Indicators at D+2 
OLTO
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
(Given IADS neutralized) 
OL a/c able and willing to 
contest coalition forces. 
OL a/c contest Coalition 
forces indirectly. 
OL experiences complete loss 
of air sovereignty and 
coalition forces have freedom 
of access for follow-on 
persistence forces. 
Increased sortie rates Civilian a/c engage in 
unscheduled or unexpected 
flights 
No SAFIRES 
OL a/c engage Coalition 
forces 
Civilian a/c fly unusual flight 
patterns No airborne OL a/c 
Indicators 
 Mobile SAMs positioned 
near high-priority assets 
Coalition forces uncontested 





























D+2 0.72 0.76 0.74 0.79 0.71 1.00 0.80 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.76
Mean 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78
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Table B.7  ODF Desired Effect 1.2, IADS Indicators at D+2 
IADS
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change in IADS 
capability or behavior. 
IADS undergone a 
significant change. 
IADS threat to coalition 
forces neutralized. 
Guided SAFIRES Decrease in SAFIRES No SAFIRES 
 Decreased radar emissions Ballistic SAFIRES 
Indicators 
 Decreased comm. emissions No radar emissions 
 
 
Tables B.8 through B.10 illustrate the indicators observed for the desired effects 
of Objective 2.  For Desired Effect 2.1 (Table B.8), assessors observe two indicators of 
state s1 in addition to the OL leadership reaction of a protest against Coalition actions 
issued through a third-party embassy.  Though OL continues to deny any WMD activity, 
the use of civilians as a deterrent to Coalition actions places OL in system state s1. 
Table B.8  ODF Desired Effect 2.1, OL Leadership Indicators at D+2 
OL
ms  0s  1s  2s  es  
State Description 




Little bit better.. System unable to 
perform mission. 
OL launches TBM at 
Coalition forces 
OL civilian a/c used 






OL issues a demarche 
against US 











OL initiates diplomacy 
via third party 
Increased terrorist 
attacks in US/Coalition 
allies 
OL launches TBM 
into own territory 
Increased heavy 
equipment traffic 




Terrorist attacks in 
neighboring countries 





For Desired Effect 2.2 (Table B.9), the electrical power indicators remain, so the 
WMD R&D facilities remain in the desired state se.  For Desired Effect 2.3 (Table B.10), 
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assessors observe increased traffic, both regular and heavy equipment, to and from the 
WMD deployment sites.  Therefore, the state vector for Objective 2 is (1,1,0). 
 
Table B.9  ODF Desired Effect 2.2, WMD R&D Indicators at D+2 
WMD R&D
ms  0s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change to system 
function. 
System unable to perform 
mission. 
Increased heavy-equipment 
traffic to and from facilities 
Local blackout around R&D 
facilities 
Increased security at WMD 
R&D facilities 
Lights stay out at R&D 
facilities while power returns 
to surrounding area 
Mobile SAM IVO WMD 
R&D facilities 
Decreased traffic to facilities 
 
Indicators 




Table B.10  ODF Desired Effect 2.3, WMD Deployment Indicators at D+2 
WMD Dep
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change to system 
function. 
System functionality affected. System unable to perform 
mission. 
Increased heavy equipment 
traffic at WMD deployment 
sites 
Increased cell phone use  Fires and explosions at WMD 
deployment sites 
Increased traffic out of/ 
decreased traffic to WMD 
deployment sites 
Increased radio use OL forces evacuate WMD 
deployment sites* 
OL forces garrison at WMD 
deployment sites* 
Increased SATCOM use  
Indicators 





* unmeasurable indicator 
 
 
B.3  ODF at D+3 
Figure B.3 illustrates the cumulative actions accomplishment at D+3.  The mean 
accomplishment for all actions has increased to 81 percent.  All actions associated with 
the IADS have been accomplished above the required 80-percent level.  However, OL 
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has reconstituted some of the EP systems and the POL for WMD deployment, which 
negates some of the actions accomplishment for Objective 2. 
 
 
Figure B.3  ODF Actions Accomplishment at D+3 
 
For Objective 1,  Tables B.11 and B.12 illustrate that assessors continue observe 
no SAFIRES, however OL is continuing to use civilian aircraft to challenge Coalition 
forces with the added indicator that OL military aircraft are now engaging Coalition 
forces.  This places the OLTO airspace in state s1 and the IADS in state se.  Therefore the 





























D+3 0.84 0.88 0.88 0.84 0.71 0.67 0.90 0.75 0.67 0.95 0.80
Mean 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81
















            IADS            EP for WMD R&D            WMD deployment 
158 
Table B.11  ODF Desired Effect 1.1, OLTO Indicators at D+3 
OLTO
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
(Given IADS neutralized) 
OL a/c able and willing to 
contest coalition forces. 
OL a/c contest Coalition 
forces indirectly. 
OL experiences complete loss 
of air sovereignty and 
coalition forces have freedom 
of access for follow-on 
persistence forces. 
Increased sortie rates Civilian a/c engage in 
unscheduled or unexpected 
flights 
No SAFIRES 
OL a/c engage Coalition 
forces 
Civilian a/c fly unusual flight 
patterns No airborne OL a/c 
Indicators 
 Mobile SAMs positioned 
near high-priority assets 
Coalition forces uncontested 
in OL airspace 
 
 
Table B.12  ODF Desired Effect 1.2, IADS Indicators at D+3 
IADS
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change in IADS 
capability or behavior. 
IADS undergone a 
significant change. 
IADS threat to coalition 
forces neutralized. 
Guided SAFIRES Decrease in SAFIRES No SAFIRES 
 Decreased radar emissions Ballistic SAFIRES 
Indicators 
 Decreased comm. emissions No radar emissions 
 
 
In Objective 2, assessors observe the indicator that OL has emplaced large 
numbers of civilian “protestors” in the vicinity of suspected WMD sites.  This lone 
indicator places the OL leadership in state s2, as seen in Table B.13.  For Desired Effect 
2.2 (Table B.14), assessors again observe the same indicators involving the electrical 
power supply, and deem the WMD R&D facilities in the desired state se.  For Desired 
Effect 2.3 (Table B.15), assessors observe the continuation of traffic in and out of the 
WMD deployment sites with the additional indicators of increased use of alternate 
communications.  The assessors determine the WMD R&D facilities to be in state s1.  
Therefore, the state vector for Objective 2 is (2,1,1). 
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Table B.13  ODF Desired Effect 2.1, OL Leadership Indicators at D+3 
OL
ms  0s  1s  2s  es  
State Description 




Little bit better.. System unable to 
perform mission. 
OL launches TBM at 
Coalition forces 
OL civilian a/c used 






OL issues a demarche 
against US 











OL initiates diplomacy 
via third party 
Increased terrorist 
attacks in US/Coalition 
allies 
OL launches TBM 
into own territory 
Increased heavy 
equipment traffic 




Terrorist attacks in 
neighboring countries 
   
 
 
Table B.14  ODF Desired Effect 2.2, WMD R&D Indicators at D+3 
WMD R&D
ms  0s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change to system 
function. 
System unable to perform 
mission. 
Increased heavy-equipment 
traffic to and from facilities 
Local blackout around R&D 
facilities 
Increased security at WMD 
R&D facilities 
Lights stay out at R&D 
facilities while power returns 
to surrounding area 
Mobile SAM IVO WMD 
R&D facilities 
Decreased traffic to facilities 
 
Indicators 
 Explosions, fires at R&D 
facilities 
 
Table B.15  ODF Desired Effect 2.3, WMD Deployment Indicators at D+3 
WMD Dep
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change to system 
function. 
System functionality affected. System unable to perform 
mission. 
Increased heavy equipment 
traffic at WMD deployment 
sites 
Increased cell phone use  Fires and explosions at WMD 
deployment sites 
Increased traffic out of/ 
decreased traffic to WMD 
deployment sites 
Increased radio use OL forces evacuate WMD 
deployment sites* 
OL forces garrison at WMD 
deployment sites* 
Increased SATCOM use  
Indicators 





* unmeasurable indicator 
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B.4  ODF at D+4 
Tables B.16 through B.17 present the observed indicators for ODF at D+4.  For 
Objective 1, assessors see for Desired Effect 1.1 (Table B.16) that the OLTO airspace 
continues to be affected by civilian aircraft even as the SAFIRE threat appears to be 
neutralized.  Assessors determine the OLTO airspace to be in state s1 and the IADS 
(Table B.17) to be in the desired state se.  Therefore, the state vector for Objective 1 is 
assessed to be (1,2). 
 
Table B.16  ODF Desired Effect 1.1, OLTO Indicators at D+4 
OLTO
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
(Given IADS neutralized) 
OL a/c able and willing to 
contest coalition forces. 
OL a/c contest Coalition 
forces indirectly. 
OL experiences complete loss 
of air sovereignty and 
coalition forces have freedom 
of access for follow-on 
persistence forces. 
Increased sortie rates Civilian a/c engage in 
unscheduled or unexpected 
flights 
No SAFIRES 
OL a/c engage Coalition 
forces 
Civilian a/c fly unusual flight 
patterns No airborne OL a/c 
Indicators 
 Mobile SAMs positioned 
near high-priority assets 
Coalition forces uncontested 
in OL airspace 
 
 
Table B.17  ODF Desired Effect 1.2, IADS Indicators at D+4 
IADS
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change in IADS 
capability or behavior. 
IADS undergone a 
significant change. 
IADS threat to coalition 
forces neutralized. 
Guided SAFIRES Decrease in SAFIRES No SAFIRES 
 Decreased radar emissions Ballistic SAFIRES 
Indicators 
 Decreased comm. emissions No radar emissions 
 
 
In Desired Effect 2.1 (Table B.18), assessors observe OL launching TBMs at 
neighboring countries and within OL territory.  Assessors also observe the continued use 
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of civilian aircraft and the exploitation of civilians through propaganda.  Since three of 
these indicators belong to state s1, assessors determine the OL leadership to be in s1. 
 
Table B.18  ODF Desired Effect 2.1, OL Leadership Indicators at D+4 
OL
ms  0s  1s  2s  es  
State Description 




Little bit better.. System unable to 
perform mission. 
OL launches TBM at 
Coalition forces 
OL civilian a/c used 






OL issues a demarche 
against US 











OL initiates diplomacy 
via third party 
Increased terrorist 
attacks in US/Coalition 
allies 
OL launches TBM 
into own territory 
Increased heavy 
equipment traffic 




Terrorist attacks in 
neighboring countries 
   
 
 
At D+4, assessors see a significant change in the achievement of Desired Effect 
2.2 (Table B.19).  Due to OL reconstitution efforts, assessors now see the return of 
electrical power to the WMD R&D facilities.  Along with the reconstitution efforts, 
assessors observe increased traffic of both heavy equipment and regular traffic at the 
R&D facilities.  These indicators place the WMD R&D facilities in the initial state s0. 
However, for Desired Effect 2.3 (Table B.20) assessors observe fires and explosions at 
the remaining WMD deployment sites, which places the WMD deployment facilities in 





Table B.19  ODF Desired Effect 2.2, WMD R&D Indicators at D+4 
WMD R&D
ms  0s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change to system 
function. 
System unable to perform 
mission. 
Increased heavy-equipment 
traffic to and from facilities 
Local blackout around R&D 
facilities 
Increased security at WMD 
R&D facilities 
Lights stay out at R&D 
facilities while power returns 
to surrounding area 
Mobile SAM IVO WMD 
R&D facilities 
Decreased traffic to facilities 
 
Indicators 





Table B.20  ODF Desired Effect 2.3, WMD Deployment Indicators at D+4 
WMD Dep
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change to system 
function. 
System functionality affected. System unable to perform 
mission. 
Increased heavy equipment 
traffic at WMD deployment 
sites 
Increased cell phone use  Fires and explosions at WMD 
deployment sites 
Increased traffic out of/ 
decreased traffic to WMD 
deployment sites 
Increased radio use OL forces evacuate WMD 
deployment sites* 
OL forces garrison at WMD 
deployment sites* 
Increased SATCOM use  
Indicators 





* unmeasurable indicator 
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Appendix C  OPERATION CLOSE GAP Data 
Appendix C presents the data used to make the assessments in the OPERATION 
CLOSE GAP (OCG) scenario in Chapter 4.  The daily cumulative actions 
accomplishment and the observed indicators are presented here for the campaign at 6 
months and the campaign at 12 months. 
C.1  OCG at 6 Months 
Figure C.1 details the actions accomplishment for OCG at six months.  After six 
months of actions, only the action to develop the early childhood TV series is completely 
accomplished.  The mean accomplishment is just over half-way at 51 percent.  
Particularly lagging is the construction of new schools, providing all schools with potable 
water and sanitation facilities, and the enrollment of out-of-school children in accelerated 
learning programs, all of which have only been just over 20 percent accomplished. 
Tables C.1 and C.2 illustrate the observed indicators at six months for OCG 
Objective 1 (Improve quality and access to education).  For Desired Effect 1 (Table C.1), 
assessors observe students earning higher grades and an increase in regular attendance.  
However, the overall enrollment has not necessarily increased.  Since approximately 33 
percent of the indicators for the initial state s0 have been observed compared with 20 
percent of the indicators for state s1, assessors determine that the student enrollment is in 
s0.  For Desired Effect 2 (Table C.2), assessors observe indicators for states s0, s1, and  s2.  
Since 50 percent of the indicators for state s2 have been observed, which is greater than 
the other two states, then assessors determine the Education Infrastructure to be in state 
s2.  Therefore, at six months, the state vector for Objective 1 is assessed to be (1,2). 
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Figure C.1  OCG Actions Accomplishment at 6 Months 
 
Table C.1  OCG Desired Effect 1, Student Enrollment Indicators at 6 Months 
Students
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change 
to enrollment and 
attendance. 
Noticeable increase 
in enrollment and 
attendance. 
System at desired 
levels.. 
Decrease in behavioral 
problems 
Development of sports, 
clubs, and after-school 
activities. 
Enrollment at desired 
level. 
Higher standardized test 
scores 
Waiting lists develop for 
model schools 
Attendance at desired 
level. 
Higher grades Administrators/teachers 
hold workshops and 
seminars to share best 
practices 
Decrease in dropout rates 




























6 mos 0.55 0.23 0.52 0.19 0.70 0.64 0.58 0.40 0.22 0.59 1.00


































               Infrastructure               Students 
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Table C.2  OCG Desired Effect 2, Education Infrastructure at 6 Months 
Infrastructure
ms  0s  1s  2s  es  
State Description 



















Schools used as 
community centers 













and around schools 
Schools develop PE 
curriculum 
Higher math and 
science test 
scores 
Schools open full time 










Schools fully staffed 
  Increase 
attendance across 
the board 
Schools at full 
capacity for students 
Indicators 





C.2  OCG at 12 Months 
Figure C.2 outlines the actions accomplishment at 12 months.  Assessors note that 
the construction of new schools and the enrollment of out-of-school students into 
accelerated programs are still lagging with just over 50 percent accomplishment each.  
The mean action accomplishment is progressing, however.  At 12 months, the mean 
accomplishment is 70 percent. 
Tables C.3 and C.4 illustrate the observed indicators at 12 months for OCG 
Objective 1.  For Desired Effect 1 (Table C.3), assessors observe one indicator in each 
state.  Since the indicator of the desired state is the a measure of the system of interest 
itself (the student enrollment), assessors determine the system to be in the desired state se. 
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Figure C.2  OCG Actions Accomplishment after 12 Months 
 
 
Table C.3  OCG Desired Effect 1, Student Enrollment Indicators at 12 Months 
Students
ms  0s  1s  es  
State Description 
Little or no change 
to enrollment and 
attendance. 
Noticeable increase 
in enrollment and 
attendance. 
System at desired 
levels.. 
Decrease in behavioral 
problems 
Development of sports, 
clubs, and after-school 
activities. 
Enrollment at desired 
level. 
Higher standardized test 
scores 
Waiting lists develop for 
model schools 
Attendance at desired 
level. 
Higher grades Administrators/teachers 
hold workshops and 
seminars to share best 
practices 
Decrease in dropout rates 



























12 mos 0.70 0.55 0.92 0.69 0.79 0.67 0.87 0.61 0.52 0.67 1.00



































               Infrastructure               Students 
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For Desired Effect 2 (Table C.4), assessors observe one indicator each of states s0 
and s1, and two indicators for state s2.  The two indicators for state s2 account for 33 
percent of state s2’s indicators, while one indicator for states s0 and s1 account for only 25 
percent of those states’ indicators.  Assessors therefore determine that the Education 
Infrastructure is in state s2.  Therefore, for Objective 1, assessors determine the state 
vector at 12 months to be (1,2). 
Table C.4  OCG Desired Effect 2, Education Infrastructure at 12 Months 
Infrastructure
ms  0s  1s  2s  es  
State Description 



















Schools used as 
community centers 













and around schools 
Schools develop PE 
curriculum 
Higher math and 
science test 
scores 
Schools open full time 










Schools fully staffed 
  Increase 
attendance across 
the board 
Schools at full 
capacity for students 
Indicators 
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